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ABSTRACT 
Effective January 1, 2012, the European Union (EU) instituted the first 
emissions trading scheme (ETS) for aviation, which affected the domestic 
and international commercial airlines flying into and out of the EU. The 
EU established the ETS to counter the global aviation sector’s role in 
releasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; however, such measures were 
met with heavy opposition by foreign countries, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), various commercial airlines and the Air 
Transport Association of America (ATA). This Article analyzes the legality 
of the EU’s unilateral ETS approach with respect to the commercial 
airline industry, examines the subsequent development of the ICAO’s 
global market based members (MBM) program, reviews strategic political 
strategies implemented by foreign nations to counter the EU’s unilateral 
action, evaluates the ICAO’s recent developments in instituting a global 
trading scheme to reduce GHG emissions, and analyzes policy issues with 
respect to the ICAO’s MGM program as it applies to the EU ETS.  
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INTRODUCTION  
When environmental efforts to reduce aircraft emissions collide with 
aviation interests, tensions around the world escalate on countless fronts. 
Unlike other modes of transportation, the aviation sector brings together a 
unique mix of global parties including sovereign nations; a regional union 
of countries offering a singular marketplace through standardized laws; 
federal, state and local governments; and major corporations representing 
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national interests of airlines, manufacturers, and suppliers.
1
 As such, 
regional or global efforts to bring forth meaningful changes to public 
policy addressing the aviation sector’s role in releasing greenhouse gases 
(GHG) into the environment could stir controversy amongst the many 
stakeholders.
2
 
Given that GHG emissions from the aviation industry account for about 
four percent of the total pollutants emitted globally, it is viewed as one of 
the fastest growing sources of emissions.
3
 The aviation industry is the only 
commercial trade industry that emits harmful emissions directly into the 
upper atmosphere
4
 and has thus become a high profile political target for 
environmental and other groups seeking to advance their sustainability 
agendas despite the industry’s limited overall impact.5 As a result, the 
European Union (EU) adopted the first emissions trading scheme (ETS) 
for aviation on November 9, 2008, which included all aircraft, 
international and domestic, landing or departing within its jurisdiction 
regardless of the country in which each aircraft is registered.
6 
In taking this step, the EU set off a chain of events whereby numerous 
countries responded in opposition to the program and took offense to the 
regional regulatory body’s bold directive, basing arguments on the 
premise that the ETS directly infringes on national sovereignty and 
corporate representatives, including air carriers.
7 
Twenty-six member 
 
 
 1. See generally Darren A. Prum and Sarah L. Catz, Greenhouse Gas Emission Targets and 
Mass Transit: Can The Government Successfully Accomplish Both Without a Conflict?, 51 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 935 (2011).  
 2. See generally Daniel B. Reagan, Note, Putting International Aviation into the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Can Europe Do It Flying Solo?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 349 
(2008). 
 3. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Gregory P. Tapis, Projections For Reducing Aircraft 
Emissions, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 701, 706 (2012). Per the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), “aircraft produce up to 4[%] of the annual global CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuels near the Earth’s surface as well as at higher altitudes.” Glenn Research Center: Fact Sheet, 
NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/glenn/about/fs10grc.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014); see also 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AVIATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSION TRADING 
SCHEME 27 (2012) [hereinafter CRS Report]. 
 4. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Trade & Transport Policy in Inclement Skies—The Conflict Between 
Sustainable Air Transportation and Neo-Classical Economics, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 639, 643 (2000). 
 5. Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Toward an International Aviation Emissions 
Agreement, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 354 (2012). 
 6. Directive 2008/101, of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Allowance Trading Within the Community, COM (2008) 818 final (Nov. 19, 2008), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:008:0003:0021:en:PDF [hereinafter 2008 
EC Aviation Directive]. The implementation of aviation into the EU ETS did not take effect until 
January 1, 2012. Id. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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states of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) signed a 
joint agreement at the ICAO Council meeting on September 30, 2011, in 
New Delhi, India, affirming their opposition to the EU’s decision to 
include aviation into its ETS,
8
 while several different carriers registered in 
the U.S. and the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) initiated 
legal action.
9
  
The contentiousness and fear of retaliation by some governments upset 
with the ETS’s application to its air carriers prompted some EU based 
airlines to delay requests for permission to expand service in those 
countries taking issue with the policy decision.
10
 Making an observation 
on the global dispute, the Chief Executive of Lufthansa stated that it 
appeared as if EU policymakers may have significantly misjudged other 
countries’ reactions to this initiative, believing instead that advancing such 
an all-inclusive strategy would generate similar approaches around the 
world.
11
  
With such a high profile global dispute, many commentators evaluated 
and considered the numerous issues that continued to unfold as 
policymakers from around the world sought a resolution.
12
 While some 
commentators focused on whether a country in opposition to the EU’s 
ETS could mount a successful legal challenge,
13
 others advocated for an 
incremental approach with bilateral and multilateral agreements paving the 
way to a mutually beneficial resolution.
14
  
 
 
 8. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., Working Paper: Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and its Impact, ICAO Council, 194th Sess., App., ICAO 
Doc. C-WP/13790 (Oct. 17, 2011).  
 9. See generally Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & 
Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-13755, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_ 
print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&part=1&docid=117193&cid=29777. 
 10. Daniel Michaels, China Trips Up Major Airbus Deal, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304231204576405680519350192 
 11. Id. 
 12. See, e.g., CRS Report, supra note 3; Reagan, supra note 2; see also Havel & Sanchez, supra 
note 5; Stephanie Switzer, Aviation and Emissions Trading in the European Union: Pie in the Sky or 
Compatible with International Law?, 39 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 1 (2012); Lorand Bartels, The 
Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS: WTO Law Considerations, ICTSD PROGRAMME ON TRADE AND 
ENV’T (Int’l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev. Issue Paper No. 6, Apr. 2012); Katelyn E. Ciolino, 
Up In the Air: The Conflict Surrounding the European Union’s Aviation Directive and the 
Implications of a Judicial Resolution, 38 BROOK. J. OF INT’L L. 1151 (2013); Gabriel S. Sanchez, In 
Defense of Incrementalism for International Aviation Emissions Regulation, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. DIG. 1 
(2012); Jol A. Silversmith, The Long Arm of the DOT: The Regulation of Foreign Air Carriers Beyond 
US Borders, 38 AIR & SPACE L. 173 (2013). 
 13. See, e.g., Switzer, supra note 12; see also Bartels, supra note 12; Ciolino, supra note 12; 
Silversmith, supra note 12. 
 14. See, e.g., Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5; see also Sanchez, supra note 12. 
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The EU’s game of brinksmanship, however, became the catalyst for the 
ICAO to recently approve the development of its own global market based 
measures (MBM) program to quantify and reduce GHG emissions directly 
attributable to aviation, and forced the European Commission (EC) to 
recommend another postponement of its ETS as applied to foreign-flagged 
carriers.
15
 This Article seeks to address the legality associated with the 
unilateral approach undertaken by the EU to affect global public policy 
with regard to the GHG emissions derived from aviation and provides an 
analysis of whether the ICAO’s response to such tactics will foster an 
MBM program which successfully reduces aircraft pollution at a global 
level. 
Part I of this Article examines how the ICAO member nations decided 
to institute a global market based members (MBM) program for aviation 
emissions. It begins by explaining the underlying motivations of the EU to 
take the step to include all foreign carriers into its ETS. Part I then 
examines the aftermath of this step, involving a lawsuit filed in the English 
High Court as well as the possible challenges available under existing 
international agreements with dispute resolution mechanisms and the use 
of bilateral or multilateral treaty options to resolve the issue. Beyond 
challenging the legality of the ETS, Part I also reviews the strategy by 
some nations, which responded politically by attempting to develop 
jurisdictional programs to qualify under the “equivalent measures” 
exemption, or via obstinate actions, threats, or retaliation.  
Part II evaluates the recent developments by the ICAO to institute a 
global trading scheme addressing GHG emissions from aviation in 
conjunction with evolving technology and whether such a program will 
resolve the dispute with the EU. This section further examines the current 
technologies available and the planned operational initiatives for aviation 
that may affect emissions based on their viability and relevance in offering 
a solution. In addition, we review the applicability of sustainable 
alternative fuels, which offer technological advancements that may 
directly reduce GHG emissions from aircraft. Finally, we consider the 
policy implications associated with the ICAO’s MBM program as it 
applies to the EU’s ETS in terms of the “equivalent measures” exception.   
 
 
 15. European Commission proposal for European Regional Airspace Approach for the EU 
Emission Trading for Aviation—Frequently asked questions, MEMO/13/905 (Oct. 16, 2013) 
(available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-905_en.htm) [hereinafter EC Memo for 
Regional ETS]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. APPLYING AN EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM TO GLOBAL AVIATION 
Following a two-decade endeavor to determine whether and how to 
abate aviation emissions to reduce climate change, the EU’s Council and 
Parliament decided to incorporate GHG emissions from aviation sources 
as part of its larger ETS beginning on January 1, 2012.
16
 This action by the 
EU ignited an intense backlash from non-European flagged carriers and 
their governments.
17 
While initially taking measured steps, the ICAO 
finally responded with a unilateral plan, which offered MBMs for a more 
global solution to aviation emission controls; however, the EU approached 
the subject with a wait-and-see position.
18
 As such, the historical steps 
taken by the many stakeholders to get to this point in time, as well as the 
peripheral events and pressures, become relevant to understanding whether 
or not the ICAO’s approach will ultimately succeed. 
A. The EU’s Decision to Take Unilateral Action  
Unilaterally instituting an ETS, the EU based its course of action on its 
obligations under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, in 
conjunction with the governments’ frustrations over the lack of the 
ICAO’s progress towards developing meaningful GHG emissions 
policies.
19
 Prior to taking this action, the EU contemplated a change in 
philosophy to a system predicated on allowing market conditions to 
allocate emissions rather than continuing its highly regulated approach 
 
 
 16. 2008 EC Aviation Directive, supra note 6. On December 21, 2011, the European Union 
Court of Justice upheld the validity of the ETS. This decision originated from a 2009 suit filed by the 
Air Transport Association of America (ATA) and three member carriers—American Airlines, 
Continental Airlines, and United Airlines—against the UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change on the legality of the EU’s plan to apply its ETS to non-EU airlines. See Kisska-Schulze & 
Tapis, supra note 3, at 729. See also Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for 
Energy & Climate Change 233, 240, 2011 E.C.R. I-13755 (opinion of the Advocate General Kokott), 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d5730a46ec17 
a242f895bda608aa1802c3.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Oa3qLe0?text=&docid=110742&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN&mode=req& dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3591251. 
 17. Andrew Galbraith, China Bans Its Airlines From Paying EU Carbon Emissions Fees, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020436940457720661359 
2210638. 
 18. See EC Memo for Regional ETS, supra note 15. 
 19. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community, at 3, COM (2006) 818 final (Dec. 20, 2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 EC Aviation Directive].  
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coordinated by the various governments.
20
 As the EU member nations 
weighed the philosophical change and acknowledged the successful 
implementation of market-based approaches in the U.S.,
21
 they gained 
confidence in formulating a policy of their own jurisdiction to address 
local environmental concerns.
22
 
To design its ETS program, the EU turned to the ICAO to develop a 
regulatory structure for GHG emissions reductions for domestic and 
international aviation sources.
23 
While leaving the responsibility of 
regulating GHG emissions emanating out of domestic aviation to the 
signatory countries, the Kyoto Protocol deferred to the ICAO on situations 
when emissions releases occur during international flights.
24
 This action 
essentially split the regulatory authority between the ICAO for 
international flights, while leaving it up to each country to determine an 
approach for domestic aviation. 
With the ICAO in the lead with respect to regulating GHG emissions in 
a broader international context, it turned to the UNFCCC to prepare and 
publish a report focusing aviation’s effect on climate change, which later 
was included in the organization’s Assembly Resolution A35-5 in 2004.25 
This resolution addressed the various tools available to those seeking to 
regulate the production of GHGs from aviation, such as voluntary efforts 
to promote reductions within member countries, the use of emissions 
 
 
 20. See Reagan, supra note 2, at 362.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change art. 2.2, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1988) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. The 
signatory nations of the Kyoto Protocol agreed upon such a role for the ICAO. During the policy 
discussion that occurred in the third conference of the parties of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in 1998, the countries in attendance discussed courses of action to 
address GHG emissions that threaten the entire planet, which eventually led to obligations from the 
signatory nations to attain quantifiable reductions in such releases. See 2008 EC Aviation Directive, 
supra note 6. For those industrialized countries that chose to join the Kyoto Protocol, they agreed to 
shrink their average GHG emissions to below 5% of their 1990 levels during the years of 2008 to 
2012. Id. In June 2009, the EU Parliament and Council committed to further reduce GHG emissions to 
30% below 1990 levels by the year 2020 in the event that it can come to a binding international 
agreement by 2015 with major emitting countries that would obligate them to make reductions by an 
effective date in 2020. Id.  
 24. Id. Article 2.2 states, “[t]he Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of 
emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine 
bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International 
Maritime Organization, respectively.” Id. 
 25. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and 
Practices Related to Environmental Protection, Assemb. Res. A35-5 (2004), compiled in Assembly 
Resolutions in Force, at I-44, ICAO Doc. 9848 (Oct. 8, 2004) [hereinafter ICAO Assemb. Resolution 
A35-5]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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based taxes and surcharges, and the employment of trading schemes.
26
 The 
ICAO decided against the creation of a global ETS system for aviation.
27
 
Instead, the organization supported an approach that offered solutions 
through voluntary measures and by mutual agreement between member 
states.
28
  
Growing restless with the lack of action by the ICAO, the EC proposed 
the inclusion of the aviation industry into its GHG ETS in 2006 in an 
effort to help generate an international solution.
29
 Undeterred by this 
intimidation tactic, the ICAO continued to support the bilateral agreement 
approach and urged against the implementation of a unilateral solution 
upon other member states;
30
 however, the EU decided to incorporate 
aviation into its existing EU ETS by 2012 based on its frustration with the 
ICAO’s lack of substantive progress.31 The EU later chose to temporarily 
suspend the application and enforcement of the program until 2014 in 
order to allow a forthcoming proposal on a comprehensive international 
market based measure at the October 2013 ICAO meeting.
32
  
1. Legal Challenges to the EU ETS 
In response to the EU’s decision to include foreign flagged carriers and 
its subsequent decision to adopt such a policy, many foreign governments 
reacted negatively.
33
 Several governments, along with China, Russia, 
India, and the U.S., interpreted the EU’s actions as violating international 
law.
34
 While only one lawsuit ensued to determine the legality of the EU’s 
 
 
 26. Id. at I-46 to I-48.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at I-47. 
 29. See 2006 EC Aviation Directive, supra note 19. 
 30. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and 
Practices Related to Environmental Protection, Assemb. Res. A36-22 (2007), compiled in Assembly 
Resolutions in Force, ICAO Doc. 9902 (Sept. 28, 2007). 
 31. See 2008 EC Aviation Directive, supra note 6. Following the EU’s lead along with its own 
dissatisfaction with the ICAO’s unresponsiveness, Australia and New Zealand proceeded to include 
the aviation industry into their own ETS while exempting international aviation fuels from each 
country’s program. See CRS Report, supra note 3, at 3. 
 32. Council Decision No. 377/2013/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 113) 1 (Apr. 24, 2013). 
 33. Alessandro Torello, EU Court Backs Carbon Trade for Airlines, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204464404577112004147787954. 
 34. Id. While the European Court of Justice considered the validity of the inclusion of foreign 
flagged carriers in the ETS program, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton along with Secretary of 
Transportation Raymond LaHood sent correspondence to several of the EU’s commissioners in an 
attempt to encourage the suspension and enforcement of the rules and to engage in negotiations to 
develop a global solution for the emissions emanating from aviation. Id. The letters also notified the 
EU commissioners that a lack of willingness on their part to move towards a more amicable solution 
will compel the U.S. “to take appropriate action.” Id. Likewise, the Chinese aviation administration 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/5
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action, those parties wishing to strike down the ETS sought relief through 
other international organizations offering dispute resolution mechanisms 
within the EU’s jurisdictional oversight. As such, the threat of utilizing 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms provided insight into the 
complexity of including the aviation industry in the EU’s ETS, as well as 
the different sources of pressure placed on all those involved seeking an 
amicable resolution.  
a. The Courts 
In late 2011, the ATA and several U.S. flagged airlines challenged the 
decision by the EU to include aviation in the ETS in the English High 
Court.
35
 In bringing the lawsuit, the ATA sought injunctive relief against 
the measures taken by the United Kingdom to implement the EU’s ETS.36 
The complaint contended that the extraterritorial nature of the directive by 
the EU was beyond its legal capacity, that the unilateral regulation ran 
contrary to the negotiated global approach agreed upon in the Kyoto 
Protocol, and that the ETS amounted to a tax on fuel consumption, which 
breaches the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and the 
Open Skies Agreement (Chicago Convention).
37
 While the English High 
Court could have decided the case on a national basis, it maintained the 
obligation to seek an advisory opinion from the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) on the validity of certain aspects of the ETS directive.
38
 In seeking 
the ECJ’s opinion, the English High Court requested guidance on whether 
specific provisions contained in international agreements could serve as a 
basis for determining the validity of EU law, along with particular 
 
 
forbid air carriers under its jurisdiction to participate in the EU’s ETS program. See Galbraith, supra 
note 17. 
 35. See generally Case C-366/10, supra note 9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. See also Kisska-Schulze & Tapis, supra note 3, at 729. 
 38. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 267, 2010 
O.J. (C 83) 164, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C: 2010:083: 
0047:0200:en:PDF [hereinafter EU Art. 267]. Pursuant to the EU’s precedent, the EU courts 
specifically reserve the right to determine the validity of an act of an EU institution; so a national court 
in a member state must refer the matter to the European Court of Justice. See Case 314/85 Foto-Frost 
v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 419, ¶¶ 15–19, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61985CJ0314:EN:HTML. However, Article 267 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for a national court of a member state to 
receive an advisory opinion from the European Court of Justice for constituent treaties or the “validity 
and interpretation of acts of the institutions” with the understanding that the “preliminary ruling” will 
provide a foundation for the underlying case. See EU Art. 267, supra. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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principles of customary international law.
39
 The court further sought 
clarification as to whether the asserted claims provided a foundation for 
invalidating or affecting the EU Directive that included aviation in the 
ETS program.
40
  
In responding to the first question, the ECJ grounded its opinion in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Article 216(2) whereby 
the international agreements approved by the EU also apply to its 
institutions, which prevails when a conflict arises from an institution’s 
action.
41
 The ECJ further explained that when evaluating the actions of an 
EU institution for conformance with the provisions contained in 
international legal agreements, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the 
international rules must bind the EU, (2) “the nature and broad logic” of 
an applicable treaty cannot preclude scrutiny of its validity within the 
larger context of the EU’s act, and (3) the applicable sections at issue must 
include a clear and precise obligation that prohibits any further steps from 
occurring towards implementation.
42
 
In applying these three criteria to the case at hand, the ECJ turned to 
evaluating the treaties included in the advisory opinion request.
43
 The 
court explained that many of its member states are signatories to the 
Chicago Convention, but the EU is not a party to the agreement, which 
precludes the application of the provisions of that treaty.
44
 Turning to the 
Kyoto Protocol and the language that calls for the reduction of GHG 
emissions in aviation through plans articulated by the ICAO, the ECJ 
recognized the EU’s status as a party to the agreement, but determined that 
the provision lacked the unconditionality and sufficiency in precision 
necessary for a legal proceeding to use as a foundation to contest the 
authority of the directive to include aviation in the ETS.
45
  
 
 
 39. See generally Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & 
Climate Change, Reference for a Preliminary Ruling from High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench 
Division (July 22, 2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2010:260:0009:0010:EN:PDF  
 40. Id. 
 41. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate Change, 
2011 E.C.R. I-13755, ¶ 50, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf? 
doclang=EN&text=&part=1&docid=117193&cid=29777 [hereinafter ECJ Final Judgment]. 
 42. Id. ¶ 51–54. 
 43. Id. ¶ 56. 
 44. Id. ¶ 57–72. The court also explained that on certain subjects the EU chose to legislate, but 
the ECJ does not maintain jurisdiction in all areas covered by the Chicago Convention. Id. ¶ 69–70. 
For example, the French and Swedish governments chose to keep its powers to grant traffic rights, to 
determine the applicable airport charges, and to allocating restricted airspace within its jurisdiction. Id. 
¶ 70. 
 45. Id. ¶ 73–78. 
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Finally, the ECJ evaluated the Open Skies Agreement, of which the EU 
is a party, and found nothing in the “broad logic” of the document to 
disqualify its use as a point of reference to attack the validity of the 
directive.
46
 In tackling the secondary part of the analysis with respect to 
the Open Skies Agreement, the Court turned to the specific provisions.  
Contained within Article 7, the applicable provision “. . . requires 
aircraft engaged in international navigation to comply with the laws and 
regulations of the European Union only when the aircraft enter or depart 
from the territory of the Member States . . .”47 In evaluating this language, 
the court found that the aircraft only falls within the auspices of the ETS if 
the operator of a flight arrives or departs from a point within an EU 
member state, but is not subject to such treatment if the aircraft merely 
travels through EU airspace.
48 
As a result, the applicable provisions of 
Article 7 do not prohibit flights terminating in EU member states from 
being included in the ETS. Therefore, no conflict with the directive exists 
based on this part of the agreement.
49
  
In considering the applicable language of Article 11, where an 
exemption exists for such items as aviation charges, taxes, levies, duties 
and fees on lubricants, fuel, and consumable supplies associated with the 
maintenance and operation of aircraft, the ECJ made a comparison to the 
underlying motivations for such actions.
50 
The Court noted that the 
primary motivation for a tax or charge comes from an intention to generate 
revenue for the public good; but the decision to broaden the ETS to 
include aviation emissions emanated out of the desire to meet certain 
environmental objectives.
51
 With this in mind, the Court found that the 
ETS did not impose a tax or charge and did not provide a basis for 
inconsistency.
52
 
Turning to Article 15, the Court evaluated the applicable environmental 
standards.
53
 According to the ECJ’s interpretation, this provision, read in 
 
 
 46. Id. ¶ 79–85. 
 47. Id. ¶ 131. 
 48. Id. ¶ 131–35. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. ¶ 136–47. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. ¶ 148–56. Article 15(3) reads “When environmental measures are established, the aviation 
environmental standards adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization in Annexes to the 
Convention shall be followed except where differences have been filed. The Parties shall apply any 
environmental measures affecting air services under this Agreement in accordance with Article 2 and 
3(4) of this Agreement.” See Air Transport Agreement of April 2007 between the European 
Community and it Member States, of the one part, and the United States of America, of the other part, 
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the context of the other referenced provisions, appeared to hold the EU 
accountable for ensuring that any environmental measures undertaken in 
the form of a charge that could limit the volume, regularity, or frequency 
of transatlantic air service not be higher than those payable by the airlines 
from an EU member state, and further must be compatible with applicable 
ICAO standards.
54
 The Court detailed that neither the English High Court 
nor the ATA or other participants provided any material evidence that the 
inclusion of aviation within the ETS violated any ICAO environmental 
standard within the meaning of its interpretation of Article 15.
55
  
Moreover, the Court considered the EU’s ETS program within the 
annex guiding principles for the design and implementation of market 
based measures as articulated in ICAO Resolution A37-19.
56
 It held that 
the EU’s ETS program did not infringe upon the standards adopted by the 
ICAO.
57
 Accordingly, the Court found no conflict between the Open Skies 
Agreement and the EU’s ETS program that would invalidate its 
implementation.
58
  
Thus, the ECJ advised the English High Court in its underlying case 
that the directive to include aviation within the larger ETS program was 
not preempted by previous international conventions and agreements like 
the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, or the Open Skies 
Agreement.
59
 
b. Commentator Suggestions For Challenges and/or Resolutions 
Upon observing the ECJ’s decision to uphold the EU’s ETS, and 
recognizing the size of the controversy, commentators from around the 
world evaluated various options for further challenges to the policy and 
offered proposals to bring forth a more mediated settlement.
60
 While it 
appears that none of these proposals were executed, they offer a glimpse 
into the growing tension between the EU and those countries opposing the 
broad inclusion of aviation into the ETS program, as well as the remaining 
 
 
April 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 134) 4, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/114872. 
pdf. 
 54. Case C-366/10, supra note 39, ¶ 148–56.  
 55. Id. ¶ 149. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. ¶ 157. 
 60. See infra Part I.A.1.b–f. 
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weapons available for quashing the directive in the event a nation 
determines the need for such an action. 
c. A Challenge Based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU  
Before considering the options outside of the EU, Professor Stephanie 
Switzer
61
 pointed out the possibility of challenging the legality of the 
directive through Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
62
 
Within the provisions of this article, “The Court of Justice of the European 
Union shall review the legality of legislative acts . . .” and allow “[a]ny 
natural or legal person . . . [to] institute proceedings against an act 
addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to 
them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and 
does not entail implementing measures.”63  
Under these provisions, Professor Switzer explained that a plaintiff 
must overcome a restrictive requirement for standing.
64
 To gain standing 
in this type of situation, the plaintiff has two options:
65
 the party asserting 
the claim must establish a “direct and individual concern” from the 
underlying act or must demonstrate that the measure itself has a direct 
effect outside of the implementation aspects.
66
  
In evaluating such a claim, Professor Switzer conceded that a plaintiff 
will face difficulties in meeting its obligations.
67
 In particular, she held that 
the burden of proving an individual concern which establishes that an 
enactment by the EU singles out the plaintiff solely and does not also 
affect others is too difficult.
68
 Hence, Professor Switzer found this 
challenge to be improbable if pursued.
69
  
 
 
 61. Dr. Stephanie Switzer is a professor of law at the University of Strathclyde in the United 
Kingdom. Her main research interests include European law and environmental and economic 
development. She has published one book and seven articles in her areas of expertise, including 
Aviation and Emissions Trading in the EI: A Flight of Fancy or Compatible With International Law?, 
supra note 12, and, with Joseph McMahon, EU Biofuels Policy—Raising the Question of WTO 
Compatibility, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 713 (2011). 
 62. See Switzer, supra note 12, at 11. 
 63. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 263, 2010 
O.J. (C 83) 164, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010: 
083:0047:0200:en:PDF. 
 64. See Switzer, supra note 12, at 11. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
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d. A Challenge Based on the Chicago Convention  
Outside of the EU courts, a challenge to the ETS program may occur 
based on the filing of a complaint with the ICAO under Article 84 of the 
Chicago Convention.
70
 According to Professor Switzer, most parties to the 
Convention rarely turn to this option,
71
 but the U.S. government exercised 
this course of action in another instance when the EU attempted to impose 
its will with regard to aircraft registered outside its jurisdiction with loud 
engines.
72
  
In April 1998, the Commission of the EU submitted a proposed 
regulation
73
 (hereinafter, the “Hushkit Regulation” or “Regulation”) to 
preclude certain aircraft from servicing EU Community airports.
74
 The 
proposed Regulation, which set an effective date of April 1, 2002, targeted 
older model aircraft, which had been “recertificated” to comply with the 
noise standards of Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention, hushkit (or noise-
muffled) aircraft and re-engined older aircraft.
75
 The Regulation was 
adopted on April 29, 1999, but was allotted a one-year postponement so as 
to facilitate consultations with the U.S. on the issue.
76 
 
The Regulation indicated that noise-modified aircraft registered in the 
U.S. and other countries outside of the EU could not operate in the EU 
 
 
 70. See Convention on Int’l Civ. Aviation at the Chicago Convention art 84, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf [hereinafter 
Chicago Convention]. The article reads, “[i]f any disagreement between two or more contracting 
States relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled 
by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by 
the Council. No member of the Council shall vote in the consideration by the Council of any dispute to 
which it is a party. Any contracting State may, subject to Article 85, appeal from the decision of the 
Council to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal agreed upon with the other parties to the dispute or to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. Any such appeal shall be notified to the Council within sixty 
days of receipt of notification of the decision of the Council.” Id. 
 71. See Switzer, supra note 12, at 11. In addition to Professor Switzer, the authors of a report to 
Congress from the Congressional Research Service also supplied this option, but they chose to focus 
on the procedural aspects of such a challenge rather than the precedent or the substance of such a 
claim. See CRS Report, supra note 3, at 27. 
 72. See infra text accompanying notes 68–89. 
 73. Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 925/1999 of 29 April 1999 on the Registration 
and Operation Within the Community of Certain Types of Civil Subsonic Jet Aeroplanes Which Have 
Been Modified and Recertificated as Meeting the Standards of Volume I, Part II, Chapter 3 of Annex 
16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 3d ed. (July 1993) 1999 O.J. (L 120) 46, Art. 2.2 
[hereinafter “Regulation”]. 
 74. Benedicte A. Claes, Comment: Aircraft Noise Regulation in the European Union: The 
Hushkit Problem, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 329, 330 (2000).  
 75. Id. at 331. See also Andreas Knorr and Andreas Arndt, ‘Noise Wars’: The EU’s ‘Hushkit 
Regulation’ Environmental Protection or ‘Eco’-protectionism?, MATERIALIEN DES 
WESSENSCHFATSSCHWERPUNKTES, GLOBALISIERUNG DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT, BD. 23, 5 (July 2002). 
 76. Claes, supra note 74, at 331. 
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after March 2002.
77 
Furthermore, aircraft which were already registered in 
an EU member state or which were registered outside the EU by a foreign 
carrier but were operational in the EU, were “grandfathered” under the 
Regulation.
78 
 
In instituting the Hushkit Regulation, the EU was steadfast in its 
concern that certain aircraft which were originally certified to meet the 
noise standards dictated by the ICAO
79
 to improve noise certification 
levels not only caused more noise pollution, but also more gaseous 
emissions and consumed more fuel than modern aircraft originally 
certified to meet the Chicago Convention standards.
80
  
The U.S. vigorously opposed the Regulation, arguing that is was 
discriminatory against United States’ air carriers, U.S.–manufactured 
hushkits and aircraft engines,
81
 and was excessively costly to the U.S.
82
 
Specifically, many U.S. airlines, including Northwest Airlines, had 
complied with the strict standards imposed by Annex 16 to the Chicago 
Convention by retrofitting aircraft engines with hushkits to dampen engine 
noise rather than purchasing newer aircraft.
83
 The U.S. also maintained 
that hushkits used on aircraft flying into and out of the EU not only 
complied with the ICAO standards, but also adequately reduced noise 
emissions.
84
 Most notably, it was argued that the Regulation failed to rely 
on performance standards, including regulating the volume of noise an 
aircraft actually makes as its basis for imposing its restrictions, but rather 
 
 
 77. See generally H.R. Rep. 106-334 (1999), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
106hrpt334/html/CRPT-106hrpt334-pt1.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).  
 78. Id. (“The regulation provides that . . . a recertified aircraft that was on the register of an EU 
member state before April 1, 1999 can be freely transferred to the registry of another EU Member 
State. Recertificated aircraft registered in non-EU States can not be operated in the EU after April 1, 
2002, unless the operator can prove that these aircraft were both operated in the EU between April 1, 
1995 and April 1, 1999, and have remained on the same register.”) 
 79. Chapter 3 of Volume 1 of Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention dictates noise allowances and 
requirements for subsonic jet aeroplanes, propeller-driven aeroplanes over 5,700 kg, and propeller-
driven aeroplanes 8,618 kg. 
 80. Claes, supra note 74, at 332. 
 81. Specifically, the Regulation arguably targeted the older-model Boeing aircraft, including the 
Boeing 727 and DC-9, which had been fit with hushkit mufflers to meet the requirements of the ICAO 
noise standards. See US Critical of EU Hush-Kit Ban, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 11, 1998), 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19981211&slug=2788480. 
 82. Claes, supra note 74, at 332. 
 83. See Reagan, supra note 2, at 360, citing Paul Stephen Dempsey, Flights of Fancy and Fights 
of Fury: Arbitration and Adjudication of Commercial and Political Disputes in International Aviation, 
32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 231, 279 (2004). 
 84. Claes, supra note 74, at 332.  
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imposed restrictions relying only on specified aircraft and engine 
technology and equipment with no regard to actual noise levels.
85
  
The U.S. was unsuccessful in preventing the Hushkits Regulation 
adoption in April 1999, or its subsequent implementation on the effective 
date.
86
 There were several attempts to negotiate with the EU regarding the 
regulation to include U.S. Cabinet members and Ambassadors requesting 
that the EU not ratify the Regulation until further discussions took place.
87
 
Finally, on March 14, 2000, the U.S. initiated a dispute resolution 
proceeding before the ICAO Council.  
EU member states responded by filing objections, specifically noting 
that the U.S.’s action was premature in that the parties failed to engage in 
sufficient negotiations; the U.S. failed to exhaust local remedies; and the 
U.S. requested relief exceeding the scope of the ICAO’s authority.88 The 
ICAO voted 26–0 in favor of the U.S. on the preliminary objections.89 In 
October 2001, the U.S. and EU member states reached a preliminary 
agreement whereby the U.S. agreed to withdraw its ICAO complaint, and 
the EU would repeal the Hushkit Regulation.
90
 Such dispute was finally 
settled on December 6, 2003.
91
 
When considering the merits of a case under Article 84 for the ETS 
directives, the hushkit scenario seems very similar. The U.S. brought an 
Article 84 action against the EU member states in the hushkit dispute 
basing its argument on the fact that the institution of such unilateral 
regulation was in opposition to the Chicago Convention and the ICAO.
92 
Prior to bringing the action, Omega Air and other carriers had already filed 
suit in the English High Court and in the High Court of Ireland to prevent 
the enactment of the hushkit prohibition.
93 
Preliminary rulings were 
referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to elicit a 
 
 
 85. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 
95 A.J.I.L. 387, 410. 
 86. Id. at 411. 
 87. See Kriss E. Brown, The International Civil Aviation Organization Is the Appropriate 
Jurisdiction To Settle Hushkit Dispute Between the United States and the European Union, 20 PENN. 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 465, 477 (2002). 
 88. Murphy, supra note 85, at 410; see also Reagan, supra note 2, at 361, citing Paul Stephen 
Dempsey, supra note 83, at 282–83. 
 89. See Reagan, supra note 2, at 361 (citing Dempsey at 283).  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 285. 
 92. See Jeffrey C. Bates & Susan M. Cooke, Potential Challenge to the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme by International Airlines, LEXOLOGY: ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE 
COUNSEL (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f8260016-904e-40ee-803e-
478c2a793fce. 
 93. Id.  
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determination of whether the EU regulation was incompatible with the 
Chicago Convention and the ICAO.
94
 Before the CJEU entered its 
decision, the ICAO adopted noise standards for aircraft engines, and the 
EU replaced its stringent hushkit prohibition in favor of adopting the 
lesser-stringent ICAO requirement.
95
 
In a similar environment, using the dispute resolution procedure under 
Article 84 of the Chicago Convention would parallel the tactic used by the 
U.S. in March 2000 to protest the EU’s aircraft hushkit regulation, which 
the EU ultimately repealed: a maneuver which also led to the EU’s 
adoption of the ICAO’s lesser-stringent noise standard.96 With regard to 
the institution of the ETS, it is not unforeseeable that in the wake of the 
negative reaction by foreign governments of the EU’s unilateral approach 
to reduce aviation emissions followed by another Article 84 objection, the 
EU could be persuaded to consider adopting the ICAO’s MBM program 
once it is fully developed. 
e. A Challenge Based on the World Trade Organization  
Providing another avenue to challenge the EU’s inclusion of aviation 
into its ETS program, the World Trade Organization (WTO) maintains the 
authority to settle disputes over international agreements.
97 
Through the 
use of a panel that determines whether a member nation’s action with 
regard to trade conforms to the agreement under the jurisdiction of the 
WTO, an offending country may receive directives to bring its policies 
into compliance after failed attempts to negotiate a settlement and hearings 
occur.
98
 Upon a determination that the policies of a member state fail to 
comply with the underlying agreement, the panel may order compliance;
99
 
however, should the offending country fail to bring its policies into 
 
 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. Note that subsequently the CJEU approved the earlier EU hushkit regulation finding that 
under EU law, “no factor” had been disclosed with respect to the Chicago Convention which would 
affect the validity of that regulation. 
 96. See Bill Carey, Industry Reps Urge ICAO Filing To Resolve Emissions Dispute, AINonline 
(Apr. 2, 2012, 10:10AM), http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-air-transport-perspective/2012-
04-02/industry-reps-urge-icao-filing-resolve-emissions-dispute.  
 97. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1-19, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401. After attempting to negotiate an amicable resolution to a dispute, a member nation may request 
the WTO convene a panel to decide the matter. Id. art. 5-6. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at Annex 2. 
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conformance, the WTO may allow retaliatory actions from those nations 
bringing the charges.
100
 
Given the power of the WTO to allow retaliatory measures against 
offending countries, some commentators turned to this option as a possible 
mechanism to resolve the conflict between the EU and other countries 
around the world and its decision to include aviation as part of its ETS 
program.
101
 In taking such action, other commentators consider possible 
actions brought under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as 
applicable accords within the jurisdiction of the WTO.
102
  
(1) GATT  
In evaluating GATT as the basis for a claim, Professor Lorand 
Bartels
103
 assessed the most relevant language and precedent of the 
agreement to form an opinion on the merits of such an action.
104
 Professor 
Bartels began by considering the legal makeup of the ETS to ascertain if it 
qualifies as a tax or charge based on paragraph 2 of Article III in GATT.
105
 
He concluded that the ETS did not qualify for treatment as a tax or charge 
within the meaning of GATT based on the opinion of the previously 
discussed ATA case,
106
 where both the Advocate General and ECJ 
determined that the motivation to cap and trade aviation emissions 
originated out of environmental concerns and not out of a desire to 
generate revenue.
107
 
Given that the ETS is not deemed a tax or charge, Professor Bartels 
next considered whether it fits within the quantitative restrictions covered 
in paragraph 1 of Article XI.
108
 In his analysis, Professor Bartels turned to 
the precedent laid forth by prior WTO panels that grappled with similar 
issues and found a broad interpretation of the term “other measures” 
within the larger framework where a country uses various methods to 
 
 
 100. Id. art. 22. 
 101. See Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1164–81; Bartels, supra note 12. 
 102. See Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1164–81; Bartels, supra note 12, at 8–26.  
 103. Dr. Lorand Bartels is a Senior Lecturer of Law and a Fellow of Trinity Hall at the University 
of Cambridge in the UK where he specializes in international law, WTO law and EU law. He has 
authored four books and 16 published articles. See Bartels, supra note 12. 
 104. See Bartels, supra note 12, at 8–21. 
 105. Id. at 8–9. 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 34–56. 
 107. See Bartels, supra note 12, at 8–9. 
 108. Id. at 9–10.  
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restrain imports.
109
 He explained that this approach by the WTO placed the 
entire emphasis on a nation’s decision and the subsequent action to limit a 
product’s importation over the rights to bring the good into the country.110 
Applying these interpretations to products transported on international 
flights in the future, he drew parallels to prior decisions that found 
restrictive effects in violation of Article XI based on the likelihood that the 
ETS will increase transportation costs regardless of whether an airline 
carrying the goods meets the terms of the directive or chooses to suffer the 
consequences of noncompliance.
111
 
After considering the treatment of goods prior to import, Professor 
Bartels evaluated whether the ETS also discriminated against products 
upon arrival into the EU based on language in Article III, paragraph 4.
112
 
In this situation, he noted the lack of precedent and conflict of opinions on 
the subject matter but determined that this provision of GATT only covers 
flights moving products within the EU and therefore questioned whether it 
created anticompetitive conditions.
113
  
Another commentator considering the same provision argued that the 
ETS program created a disparity because an imported product must travel 
farther and would require the purchase of more GHG emission allowances 
than a similarly transported domestic good.
114
 Professor Bartels 
acknowledged that aviation receives less favorable treatment than other 
modes of travel, but failed to see an internal disparity because many 
products arriving via aircraft will ultimately receive the same treatment 
during transit to their final destination, which makes Article III 
inapplicable to the ETS program.
115
 
With an understanding as to the applicability of Articles XI and III, 
both commentators also evaluated paragraph 1 of Article I to determine 
whether the EU’s ETS program conflicts with the requirements associated 
with Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment.
116
 Under this requirement, 
 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 10–12.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1168. 
 115. See Bartels, supra note 12, at 1112. 
 116. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1166–68; Bartels, supra note 12, at 12–13. With respect to 
Professor Bartels’ analysis, he qualified it on the basis that no guidance exists on whether GATT 
applies to the international transportation of goods. See Bartels, supra note 12, at 12. He further 
explains that a narrow reading of the applicable provisions could apply only to the “act” of importing 
and not the transportation aspects, which could lead to discriminating between the different modes; but 
he also raises the counterpoint used for a broad interpretation as applied to Article XI discussed in the 
text of endnotes 80 to 83. Id. at 13, 40 nn.80–83.  
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panel precedent dictates that the ETS program must not give an 
“advantage” to “like products originating” from different WTO member 
countries; therefore, a member nation could not cause the price associated 
with an imported good to rise solely due to the mode and distance it 
traveled.
117
  
Based on this precedent, both commentators agreed that the EU’s ETS 
program does not equally give a uniform “advantage” to all goods 
emanating from WTO member countries and violates Article I, paragraph 
1.
118
 Furthermore, if the EU chose to exempt another nation based on the 
“equivalent measures” provision of the ETS program, an advantage will 
develop which fails to apply equally amongst WTO member states.
119
 
Continuing his evaluation of the “transportation of goods” precedent as 
applied to the ETS, Professor Bartels also considered Article V, which 
covers the freedom of transit.
120
 The main question under this article is 
whether the ETS represents an “unnecessary restriction” or “unreasonable 
regulation.”121 Supporters of the program will argue that the ETS is 
essential and not excessive because the polluters are covering the costs of 
their environmental contamination.
122
 He considered this viewpoint in 
light of paragraph 4 of Article III to settle on a belief that no violation 
existed because it allows variances among the internal transportation 
charges based on real economic costs.
123
 
Professor Bartels did suggest that a violation may occur when 
considering goods that transit through other countries for import into the 
EU.
124
 In such a situation, paragraph 6 of Article V would require 
equivalent treatment; however, no violation would occur when imported 
goods make intermediate stops in other WTO member countries.
125
 
Finally, both commentators evaluated the justification of the EU’s 
actions based on Article XX’s ten categories that allow social and 
 
 
 117. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1166; Bartels, supra note 12, at 12. 
 118. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1166–67; Bartels, supra note 12, at 13.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Bartels, supra note 12, at 13. Before conducting his analysis, Professor Bartels clarifies that 
even though Article V, paragraph 7 creates an exemption for the operation of aircraft in transit the 
provision specifically includes the transportation of goods via aviation. Id. 
 121. Id. at 14. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. Professor Bartels explains that a product’s origin could originate in country A and end up 
in an EU member nation B. Id. If the product traveled directly from A to B, the ETS would apply to 
the entire trip. However, if the good stopped in Country C along the way, only the portion from C to B 
would fall within the emissions program. Id. 
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environmental exceptions.
126
 To assert this defense, a two-tier analysis 
applies whereby the defending WTO member country must show that the 
policy fits within one of the exceptions, and which satisfies the 
requirement of the preamble (referred to as the Chapeau of Article XX).
127
 
In addressing the first tier, both commentators addressed the 
applicability of Articles XX(g) and XX(b).
128
 Article XX(g) allows 
policies in “relation to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” 
that are “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption[.]”129 In spite of the fact that the WTO 
maintains no precedent on the issue relating to whether climate change 
mitigation is equivalent to the conservation of natural resources, both 
commentators pointed out that a prior appellate panel determined that 
clean air is an exhaustible resource, which provides sufficient guidance; 
and the EU’s ETS plan applies equally to foreign and domestic 
production. Consequently, both commentators made a preliminary 
conclusion that the EU’s ETS policy qualified under the first tier for an 
exemption under Article XX(g).
130
 
Article XX(b) states that an applicable policy may be excused if it is 
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health[.]”131 Both 
commentators evaluated whether the ETS program will immediately or 
timely deliver a safeguard towards human, animal, or plant life or 
health.
132
 Commentator Katelyn Ciolino expressed that the revenue from 
the sale of the emission permits would ultimately translate into 
environmental efforts to reduce emissions by creating a financial 
disincentive for those using aircraft that pollute through higher prices for 
allowances.
133
 Professor Bartels found enough WTO precedent to 
conclude that such a material influence would occur.
134
 
 
 
 126. See Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1168–81; Bartels, supra note 12, at 14–21. 
 127. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, 22–23 WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). More specifically, under a preamble analysis, it must 
be determined that the policy in dispute would not apply in a manner that establishes “a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,” and is 
not “a disguised restriction on international trade.” Id. at 38. See GATT, infra note 100, ¶ 1. 
 128. See Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1169–72; Bartels, supra note 12, at 14–16. 
 129. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. 
XX [hereinafter GATT 1947]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
187 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
 130. See Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1169–71; Bartels, supra note 12, at 14–15. 
 131. GATT 1947, supra note 119, art. XX(b). 
 132. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1171–12; Bartels, supra note 12, at 15–16. 
 133. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1171.  
 134. Bartels, supra note 12, at 15–16.  
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Moreover, the commentators inquired as to whether a different 
approach might reasonably yield a less trade-restrictive option in 
accordance with the Article XX(b) analysis.
135 
While Ms. Ciolino drew 
attention to the lack of a counterproposal to the EU ETS program,
136
 
Professor Bartels explained the extreme difficulty in conducting a 
meaningful analysis on the subject and that to exclude non-EU aviation 
would run counter to the stated objectives.
137
 As such, both commentators 
determined that the ETS program could survive the initial review for 
Article XX(b) applicability.
138
 
Turning to the second tier of the Article XX inquiry, the preamble 
requires that the policy under review needs to receive an evaluation so as 
to not create a situation of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or a 
“disguised restriction on international trade[.]”139 Should any of the three 
situations arise, the challenged policy will fail to gain protection under 
Article XX.
140
  
When evaluating each of the situations separately, both commentators 
turned to the applicable precedent from WTO cases and applied it to the 
EU’s ETS program.141 While Professor Bartels quickly dismissed the ETS 
as being motivated by a protectionist agenda to restrict trade, Ms. Ciolino 
withheld judgment pending an analysis.
142
 She evaluated the underlying 
criteria of the policy’s adoption to determine that the EU did not take such 
unacceptable steps because it publicly announced its intentions, which 
does not violate the preamble of Article XX.
143
 
 
 
 135. Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh Chilled and Frozen 
Beef, ¶ 161, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000). 
 136. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1171. 
 137. Bartels, supra note 12, at 16. 
 138. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1172; Bartels, supra note 12, at 16.  
 139. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, supra note 126, at 23.  
 140. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, 
¶ 184, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). When this type of analysis occurs, prior precedent explains 
that the WTO member nation seeking to utilize an Article XX exception bears the burden of proof that 
the policy it is seeking to protect does not violate any of the three situations so “as to frustrate or defeat 
the legal obligations of the holder of the right[.]” See Appellate Body Report United States—Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 126, at 22. Because this rigorous approach 
creates such a daunting task, one commentator likened this impediment to threading a needle in which 
only a few environmental policies will survive. Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT 
Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
739, 741–43 (2001). 
 141. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1179–80; Bartels, supra note 12, at 16–19.  
 142. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1179–80; Bartels, supra note 12, at 16.  
 143. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1179–80. 
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When addressing the discrimination situations, both commentators 
focused their analysis on two different scenarios where the ETS could 
create biases.
144
 They pointed out that the ETS will treat two aircraft that 
travel the same distance with goods differently if one stops along the way, 
which demonstrates a lack of nexus between the policy’s objectives and 
implementation.
145
 This also translates into an inconsistency with respect 
toward the overall efficiency and application of the policy because a 
transported good with a very low carbon footprint may travel much farther 
than a good that causes greater pollution but moves a shorter distance.
146
  
Ms. Ciolino also noted that other elements of the ETS survive the 
analysis required for both discriminations.
147
 She explained that the 
participatory nature of the ETS program removes the due process and 
procedural hurdles associated with this language, and the fact that the EU 
takes on a leading role with the negotiations occurring at the ICAO and 
UNFCCC demonstrates movement toward a multilateral agreement.
148
 As 
such, she believes that an unaltered ETS will not withstand a WTO inquiry 
as an exemptions under Article XX.
149
 
In contrast, Professor Bartels’ analysis finds justification behind the 
discriminatory policies.
150
 He based his opinion on the fact that the EU 
made a conscious decision to exclude portions of a flight that do not 
terminate in its jurisdiction. He also believes that the EU can alleviate the 
discrimination issues by changing its definition to include all flights 
around the word.
151
 Moreover, he explains that the EU could also 
substantiate its policy due to an inability to acquire pertinent data on the 
appropriate flights unless a “terminal point” occurs in the EU.152 Thus, he 
concludes that an Article XX analysis will permit the EU’s ETS to 
continue under GATT.
153
  
 
 
 144. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1176–17; Bartels, supra note 12, at 20–11. 
 145. Id. Ms. Ciolino also points out that this disparity provides an incentive to make stops at 
airports just outside EU airspace to reduce the calculated charges under the ETS program and may 
actually lead to more pollution rather than les. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1177. 
 146. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1176–77; Bartels, supra note 12, at 20–21. 
 147. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1177–80.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 1180–81. 
 150. Bartels, supra note 12, at 20–21.  
 151. Id. Professor Bartels’ opinion is based on the flexibility of the EU’s ETS and the applicable 
precendent of prior WTO decisions and the language used by the ECJ in its opinion in the ATA case.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
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(2) GATS  
Paralleling GATT, GATS offers another avenue for a WTO member 
nation to contest the EU’s ETS. While GATT covers tangible property, 
GATS involves trade in relation to services such as tourism. In 
conjunction with his analysis of GATT, Professor Bartels also evaluated 
the feasibility of using GATS as a basis for a claim against the ETS.
154
 He 
commenced this analysis by considering the applicability of the GATS 
Annex on air transport, which seemingly excludes air transport services 
from the agreement’s ETS coverage.155  
When evaluating the scope of the Annex and the language contained in 
paragraph 2, Professor Bartels found a broad and inclusive definition that 
embraced the extent and manner of services offered by foreign providers 
in conjunction with the underlying regulatory environment while 
determining that the exemption for policies that affect trade in air transport 
services does not apply to the facts pertaining to the ETS;
156
 however, his 
inquiry into whether the WTO maintained sufficient jurisdiction pursuant 
to paragraph 4 concluded that a panel overseeing such a claim would need 
to yield its authority until the termination of all ICAO remedies prior to 
proceeding with its duties under GATS.
157
 
While maintaining jurisdiction poses a large obstacle to proceeding 
within the WTO’s purview, Professor Bartels continued his analysis by 
considering whether the Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation under 
GATS also came into play under paragraph 1 of Article II.
158
 While GATS 
allows a more direct evaluation than under GATT, he quickly determined 
that the ETS would most certainly affect consumers that travel outside of 
the EU and in a disproportionate manner.
159
 As a result, he concluded that 
the ETS would fail to grant the same advantage to all “like services” and 
“service suppliers” under GATS.160 
Further, Professor Bartels contemplated the use of other sources for a 
claim, but noted that GATS is only relevant to the degree that a WTO 
member commits to specific services.
161
 In this area, the EU took such an 
 
 
 154. Id. at 22-26.  
 155. Id. at 22 
 156. Id. at 22–23. 
 157. Id. at 23–24. 
 158. Id. at 24.  
 159. Id. He explained that geographical factos will play a big role in these types of situations.  
 160. Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, Professor Bartels clarified that the 
previous analysis under GATT was if the EU approves “equivalent measures” exceptions to a limited 
number of countries, a similar violation would occur within GATS. Id.  
 161. Id.  
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action with respect to tourism and recreational services abroad; however, 
the analysis by Professor Bartels in relation to the different provisions of 
GATS with respect to the ETS found no basis for discrimination due to the 
national origin of the service or provider.
162
 
Finally, GATS provides similar exceptions as discussed earlier with 
respect to GATT, but the agreement only contains Article XIV(b), which 
provides similar language to Article XX(b) of GATT.
163
 
Professor Bartels determined the analysis for GATS would mirror that 
used for GATT and would generally make the ETS justifiable for 
aviation.
164
 He concluded that in the event the ETS overcame the obstacles 
of jurisdiction and fit within the meaning of GATS, the WTO would likely 
find it justifiable so long as a reasonable alternative fails to materialize and 
also meets the EU’s objectives in a less trade restrictive manner.165 
f. Incorporating a Bilateral or Multilateral Treaty  
Offering another solution in an attempt to find a middle ground to 
resolve the various climate change issues emanating from international 
civil aviation, Professors Havel
166
 and Sanchez
167
 proposed drafting a 
treaty to address such concerns.
168
 They considered applicable 
international legislative directives and controls for aircraft emissions, as 
well as an evaluation of whether a global approach would offer a 
reasonable solution.
169
 In completing their analysis, both commentators 
negated the idea that all of the sovereign global nations could come to an 
agreement, due in large part to the significant disparity of interests.
170
 As 
such, they determined that a broad accord would produce a more desirable 
outcome through a bilateral or multilateral approach.
171
 
 
 
 162. Id. at 24–25.  
 163. Compare GATT 1994, supra note 128, art. XX(b) with General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 
art. XIV(b), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1167 (1994). 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 26. 
 166. Professor Brian F. Havel is the Director of International Affairs, Director of the International 
Aviation Law Institute, and a Distinguished Research Professor of Law at DePaul University. 
 167. Professor Gabriel Sanchez is a Senior Research Fellow and Adjunct Professor at the 
International Aviation Law Institute at DePaul University.  
 168. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 351.  
 169. See id. at 357–75. 
 170. Id. at 353, 372–75. Professors Havel and Sanchez also discussed whether a global solution 
could overcome the concept of International Parentianism, which they explain as “all state parties must 
believe themselves better off by their lights [sic] as a result of the . . . treaty.” Id. at 372 (quoting ERIC 
A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 6 (2010)). 
 171. Id. at 375–76. The commentators based their decision on the fact that the 2007 Agreement 
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In settling on an underlying mechanism to bring forth meaningful 
reductions in GHGs emanating from aviation sources, Professors Havel 
and Sanchez considered various options to include grounding those 
aircraft which emit the greatest volume of emissions, limiting “high-
volume routes” to only the most “fuel efficient aircraft,” and placing 
quotas similar to the days prior to deregulation in the U.S.
172
 They 
ultimately selected MBMs as the preferred method because such an 
approach allows greater flexibility within a less burdensome framework 
than the other alternatives, and MBMs are endorsed by the ICAO and 
various air carriers as the preferred solution.
173
 
In addressing the enforcement aspects of their proposal, the 
commentators analyzed the 2007 U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement (2007 
Agreement) as a template for their accord.
174
 They found that the language 
and approach fit within the existing framework of international law and 
suggested that each party to the agreement maintain its own responsibility 
for imposing and enforcing a common emissions tax or trading system 
upon those carriers within its jurisdiction.
175
 Professors Havel and Sanchez 
further borrowed a provision from the 2007 Agreement, which allows any 
party to the accord to voluntarily relinquish oversight of the emissions 
emanating from aircraft within its jurisdiction to another agreement 
participant or a joint regulatory body.
176
 
While Professors Havel and Sanchez acknowledged that issues such as 
fragmentation may also exist, they viewed this proposal as an incremental 
step towards responsible actions taken by those countries interested in 
lowering their environmental impact with respect to aviation.
177
 To this 
end, no global regime currently upholds the uniformity in environmental 
 
 
demonstrated large amounts of political desire towards aviation solutions and cooperation between two 
major geographic markets, which could serve as the foundation for a broader treaty to address GHG 
emissions. Id. They pointed out that sixty percent of the global air traffic movements occur within the 
airspace of the U.S. and EU, which could have a formidable affect on such an endeavor. Id. at 380. 
While this geographic footprint would still leave some major air transportation hubs outside the reach 
of the agreement, the commentators envisioned their approach as a way to entice other nations to join 
the accord by offering such widespread access with liberal air services trade relations that those 
countries outside of the treaty could not receive otherwise. Id. at 381. 
 172. Id. at 376. 
 173. Id. at 376–77. 
 174. Id. at 379–80. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 380. This idea comes from the 2007 Agreement where the parties mulled over the 
ramifications of merging the regulatory approaches to security, safety, competition, and environmental 
issues while also demonstrating an inclination to establish a joint committee to address such issues 
moving forward. Id.  
 177. Id. at 383–85. 
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norms and enforces the commitments agreed to by participants.
178
 The 
proposal from these commentators ultimately balances the need for GHG 
emission reductions without causing economic harm to the aviation 
industry, while also moving towards a larger, global framework.
179
 
Accordingly, outside of a complaint filed with the ICAO based on the 
Chicago Convention, the commentators conclude that a challenge 
invalidating the EU’s ETS will likely fail based on the various forums 
available for redress.
180
 Meanwhile, U.S. and foreign governments have 
voiced displeasure at the EU’s unilateral approach to reduce GHG 
emissions, while simultaneously expressing the need for a more 
“consensus-based” solution.181 The multilateral treaty agreement offers a 
passive approach towards resolving global negativity of the EU’s 
implantation of the ETS.  
(1) Political Responses 
Outside of mounting a challenge or negotiating a treaty, many nations 
have considered alternative strategies in response to the EU’s policy. 
China turned to the “equivalent measures” language of the EU’s directive 
as an avenue to resolve the dispute followed by warnings of negative 
consequences should it find its proposals rejected.
182
 In contrast, India, 
Russia, and the U.S. considered options within their own jurisdictional 
powers that directly challenged the EU’s ETS or threatened to do so 
should the program proceed.
183
 Ultimately, these political alternatives 
produce benefits and penalties, which impose pressure on each nation 
involved in the dispute to seek an amicable resolution. 
(a) Equivalent Measures  
In an attempt to resolve the issues with the ETS using a bilateral 
approach, China turned to the “equivalent measures” language contained 
in the EU’s directive as a means for negotiating an exemption.
184
 The 
 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 385. 
 180. See Switzer, supra note 12, at 11; Bartels, supra note 12, at 20–21, 26. 
 181. Cf. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 509, 126 Stat. 11 
(2012).  
 182. See CRS Report, supra note 3, at 28. 
 183. See infra text accompanying notes 173–92. 
 184. See CRS Report, supra note 3, at 28. The applicable provision states 
[i]f a third country adopts measures, which have an environmental effect at least equivalent to 
that of this Directive, to reduce the climate impact of flights to the Community, the 
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Chinese strategy emerged when the Civil Aviation Administration of 
China (CAAC) unveiled its master plan in April 2011 to deal with aircraft 
GHG emissions.
185
 
While the unveiling of this plan coincided with the conspicuous 
absence of mandatory ETS data reporting by Chinese airlines for the EU’s 
May 2011 deadline,
186
 the CAAC’s proposal called for three phases.
187
 
Using 2005 as a baseline, the goal was to reduce aircraft emissions by 
eleven percent during phase one (2011 to 2012), fifteen percent in phase 
two (2013 to 2015), and twenty-two percent in the phase three (2015 to 
2020).
188
 The CAAC expected to see these efficiencies come about 
through the encouragement and use of alternative fuels, as well as the 
integration of new generation engines by its domestic airlines.
189
 
In response, the EU announced that it would study the plan put forward 
by China to determine if it met the requirements associated with 
“equivalent measures.”190 The Chinese made the point that they should fall 
 
 
Commission should consider the options available in order to provide for optimal interaction 
between the Community scheme and that country’s measures, after consulting with that 
country. Emissions trading schemes being developed in third countries are beginning to 
provide for optimal interaction with the Community scheme in relation to their coverage of 
aviation. Bilateral arrangements on linking the Community scheme with other trading 
schemes to form a common scheme or taking account of equivalent measures to avoid double 
regulation could constitute a step towards global agreement. Where such bilateral 
arrangements are made, the Commission may amend the types of aviation activities included 
in the Community scheme, including consequential adjustments to the total quantity of 
allowances to be issued to aircraft operators. 
See 2008 EC Aviation Directive, supra note 6, § 17. 
 185. P.R.C., CHINA’S ACTION PLAN TO LIMIT AND REDUCE CO2 EMISSIONS FROM 
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, 11 (2012), available at http://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/ 
Documents/ActionPlan/China_en.pdf. In particular, the government of China argues that it will be 
adversely affected by the EU’s ETS, since its geographic location forces the covered aircraft to follow 
longer flight paths that will eventually translate into higher fees. See Hart, infra note 191. The 
government also recognizes that the fees will increase significantly because China’s civil aviation 
industry continues to expand. Id.  
 186. Elena Ares, House of Commons, EU ETS and Aviation, SN/SC/5533, 11 (May 23, 2012), 
available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn05533.pdf. Following this noticeable 
reporting absence, the government of China confirmed its directive to forbid its air carriers from 
participating in the ETS program in February 2012. Chris Buckley, China bans airlines from joining 
EU emissions scheme, Reuters (Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/06/ 
us-china-eu-emissions-idUSTRE81500V20120206.  
 187. P.R.C., CHINA’S ACTION PLAN TO LIMIT AND REDUCE CO2 EMISSIONS FROM 
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, 11 (2012), available at http://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/ 
Documents/ActionPlan/China_en.pdf.  
 188. Supra note 187. 
 189. Civ. Aviation Admin. Of China, 12th Five-Year Plan of China Aviation Development (Apr. 
2, 2011).  
 190. Saqib Rahim, U.S.-E.U. Showdown Over Airline Emissions Begins Today, NY TIMES (July 5, 
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/07/05/05climatewire-us-eu-showdown-over-
airline-emissions-begins-88684.html?pagewanted=all. While not committing to approving the Chinese 
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under a different standard due to their status as a developing nation, and 
any attempt to treat them differently would violate the UNFCCC guiding 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.”191 One 
commentator drew attention to the fact that the plan put forward by China 
offered improvements in efficiency rather than a curb in the output of 
GHGs, and, therefore, the plan would face obstacles for approval as an 
“equivalent measure.”192 
Further clarifying its plan in an attempt to satisfy the EU and gain 
approval as an “equivalent measure,” the Chinese government offered to 
institute a passenger tax on international flights in April 2012.
193
 The 
government further explained that the collected revenue would go towards 
the reduction of emissions generated from aviation, security upgrades, and 
research and development in the newly established Civil Aviation 
Development Foundation.
194
 Accordingly, the EU’s delegation evaluating 
China’s earlier proposal received direction to include this new provision in 
its scope of work to determine whether it should conduct bilateral 
negotiations for an “equivalent measures” exemption.195 
(b) Retaliatory Measures  
Taking a more adversarial approach, India, Russia, and the U.S. either 
took direct action against the EU’s ETS or threatened to take retaliatory 
measures while China issued similar warnings and directives in 
 
 
plan as an “equivalent measure,” the EC Director General for Climate Change explained that the 
commission “did not set any kind of standard as to what can be considered an equivalent measure 
because we do not want to restrict the range of possibilities.” (See Hart, infra note 179 (citing 
translation from Ou meng yuan tan tao huo mian (European Union Wants to Talk About Exemption)), 
21 shi ji jing ji bao dao (21 Century Economic Report) (July 19, 2011), available at 
http://stock.jrj.com.cn/2011/07/19034010476743.shtml. 
 191. Melanie Hart, Europe Moves to Limit Aviation Emissions, China Follows: EU and China to 
Begin Limiting Flight Emissions While U.S. Airlines Fight Regulations, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Aug. 1, 2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2011/08/01/10195/ 
europe-moves-to-limit-aviation-emissions-china-follows/. The Chinese perspective of the UNFCCC 
principle asserts a viewpoint that holds their nation accountable for lower contributions towards the 
reduction of GHGs because of its lower historical emissions and its present need for ongoing 
advancements as a developing country. Id. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Barbara Lewis, EU climate boss: studying China’s airline CO2 plan, Reuters (Apr. 19, 
2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/19/uk-eu-china-airlines-idUSLNE83I00S 
20120419. 
 194. Barbara Lewis, EU climate chief: looking at China’s airline carbon plan, Reuters (Apr. 19, 
2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/19/us-eu-china-airlines-idUSBRE83I091 
20120419. 
 195. Id.  
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combination with its “equivalent measures” proposal.196 China’s threats 
included a trade war and the cancellation of all contracts for the delivery 
of Airbus-manufactured aircraft if the plan to qualify Chinese air carriers 
under the “equivalent measures” provisions failed.197 Russia continued to 
enforce its overflight charges for Siberia upon EU carriers irrespective of 
its agreement to allow passage free of charge for all new rights issued after 
January 2012 and to eliminate those still in effect after January 2014.
198
 
Both India and China directed their air carriers flying to EU member 
countries to disregard any compliance requirements emanating from the 
ETS.
199
 Such action led to a visible absence in the 2011 emissions reports 
of ten airlines registered in India and China, which the EU Commission 
published in May 2012.
200
  
Likewise, the U.S. Congress disapproved of the EU’s unilateral 
directive and noted such dissatisfaction in the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012.
201
 In this legislation, Congress expressed its opinion 
that the unilateral action by the EU to broaden its ETS to include aircraft 
regulated by foreign jurisdictions ran contrary to the Chicago Convention, 
and other relevant air service agreements. The Act emphasized the need to 
bring together a coalition to address climate change policy on a global 
basis.
202
 Congress also urged the EU to take an alternative course of action 
 
 
 196. See Sanchez, supra note 12, at 2.  
 197. See Hart, supra note 191.  
 198. Cathy Buyck, EU, Russia Resume Talks On Siberian Overflight Fees, AVIATION WEEK, Mar. 
21, 2013, available at http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_03_21_2013_ 
p0-561623.xml. Many countries charge an overflight fee to the operators of a flight that flies through 
its airspace without landing or taking-off in its jurisdiction. See e.g., Fed. Aviation Admin., Overflight 
Fees: Fees in U.S.-Controlled Airspace, available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/ 
headquarters_offices/aba/overflight_fees/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
 199. See Ares, supra note 186, at 9.  
 200. Id. at 11. 
 201. See Pub. L. 112-95, § 509 (2012). 
 202. See Id. § 509(1). The decision by Congress to show its displeasure with the unilateral 
approach by the EU brings to the forefront a hypocritical policy position by the U.S. government with 
respect to extraterritorial requirements in aviation. See Silversmith, supra note 12. For example, 
Congress prohibited inflight gambling for all carriers on international routes to and from the U.S. 
regardless of the country of registration in the Federal Aviation Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 41311(a) (2000). This unilateral action by the U.S. government to regulate another nation’s aircraft 
outside its own territorial airspace sparked outrage and protests by numerous foreign governments and 
similar threats of retaliation by those nations affected by the prohibition. See Darren A. Prum, Flight 
Check: Are Air Carriers Any Closer to Providing Gambling on International Flights that Land or 
Depart from the United States?, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 71, 72 (2009). This hypocritical position with 
respect to gambling and other areas would allow the EU the opportunity to assert a defense under the 
Doctrine of Unclean Hands and could ultimately pose an obstacle to any attempt to seek relief through 
a court using equitable remedies under common law principles. However, Mr. Silversmith points out 
that the more troubling predicament that comes from these types of policies where one country 
imposes its will on another’s sovereignty through aviation is the diminishment of the US government’s 
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and to work collegially with other ICAO member nations to develop a 
consensus-based solution to address GHG emissions.
203
 Finally, Congress 
directed all officials with authority relating to aviation to “use all political, 
diplomatic, and legal tools” within their powers to ensure that the EU’s 
ETS does not pertain to aircraft under the U.S. Government’s 
jurisdiction.
204
 
To this end, Professor Sanchez predicted the possibility of an 
unrestrained aviation trade war that unfairly punishes and effects innocent 
parties including airlines, airports, aircraft manufactures and the public at 
large should both sides continue to hold their respective positions.
205
 He 
recalled that these kinds of tensions historically exist in the highly 
competitive environment surrounding the sales and subsidies associated 
with new aircraft as seen between the U.S.-based Boeing Company and its 
EU competitor, Airbus.
206
 As such, the underlying tensions that already 
exist may resurface, and the lack of a strong working relationship between 
the EU and U.S. due to a trade war emanating out of the applicability of 
the ETS, could serve as a major obstacle to the larger goal of addressing 
GHG emissions and climate change.
207
 
Moreover, Professor Sanchez called attention to the fact that a trade 
war will also damage other international efforts.
208
 Because of the EU’s 
geographic location, the ETS will affect the high volume routes associated 
with Asia and the transpacific as well as the sparsely regulated emerging 
market surrounding the Persian Gulf.
209
 A trade war caused by the EU will 
erode their leadership position in the world on the issue of climate change 
as it relates to aviation and will minimize support from other nations in 
affecting meaningful change to GHG emissions from aircraft.
210
 
In addition, a trade war between the U.S. and the EU will hinder other 
endeavors to reduce GHG emissions from aviation, including any ongoing 
projects to enhance the existing air traffic management systems.
211
 Absent 
 
 
ability to claim the moral “high ground” because of its previous actions, which will ultimately affect 
its leverage in future negotiations to resolve the ETS situation. See Silversmith, supra note 12, at 174–
75. 
 203. See id. § 509(2).  
 204. See id. § 509(3).  
 205. See Sanchez, supra note 12, at 3.  
 206. Id. at 5. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. at 4–5. 
 210. Id. at 5.  
 211. Id. These improvements reduce delay at airports and more direct routing by providing more 
efficiency with the airspace, which ultimately decreases the unnecessary burning of fuel. Id.  
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a strong relationship between the U.S. and the EU with regard to aviation, 
the commitment of both parties to complete the project with a seamless 
interface across jurisdictions will be jeopardized, and the GHG benefits 
associated with it will be lost.
212
 Thus, Professor Sanchez recognized that 
the fallout from a trade war emerging out of retaliatory actions will cause 
immediate negative economic effects. The real harm, however, will be the 
effect on the overall goal of achieving a mutually agreeable resolution 
addressing GHG emissions from aviation from a group of willing 
stakeholders.
213
 
B. The ICAO’s Proposed Resolution and Fate of the EU’s ETS 
Initially, the ICAO’s response to the dispute between the EU and other 
member nations regarding the ETS was to approve a resolution that 
accelerated its work in developing a comprehensive framework to address 
MBMs for emissions emanating from international aviation.
214
 Resolution 
A37-19 called for member nations to collectively improve fuel efficiency 
by two percent annually until 2020, and then set an aspirational goal to 
reduce the same percentage each year from 2021 to 2050.
215
 It also invited 
member states to prepare and submit action plans on how they expected to 
achieve the fuel efficiency reduction objectives and aspirational goals by 
June 2012.
216
 Finally, the ICAO advocated for member states to devise 
their own MBM for international aviation, to “engage in constructive 
bilateral and/or multilateral consultations and negotiations with other 
States to reach an agreement,” and to allow an exemption to a program for 
those aircraft under the jurisdiction of a developing country.
217
  
Before the next meeting of the ICAO Assembly, the UNFCCC 
requested an update on the efforts to address climate change in aviation, 
from which the ICAO noted progress on the action items emanating out of 
Resolution A37-19.
218
 In its report, the ICAO explained that the provision 
 
 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
 214. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and 
practices related to environmental protection—Climate change, Assemb. Res. A37-19 (2010), 
compiled in Assembly Resolutions in Force, at I-67-74, ICAO Doc. 9958 (Oct. 8, 2010). 
 215. Id. at I-71.  
 216. Id.  
 217. Id. at I-71. Given the flexibility of this statement and the ability to derive multiple 
interpretations, Professor Bartels explained that the EU nations took the position that it implicitly 
endorsed the unilateral measures they already began to implement. Bartels, supra note 12, at 6.  
 218. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 35th Sess., Information relevant to 
emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport, Agenda Item 9(a), at 4, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2011/MISC.9 (2011). 
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calling for action plans by member nations allowed the organization to 
make a noteworthy shift from a “[s]tandards and policies setting” approach 
to one that emphasizes the “implementation” aspects.219 Recognizing the 
joint agreement that affirmed the opposition of twenty six countries to the 
EU’s decision to include aviation in its ETS at the ICAO Council Meeting 
in New Delhi, India two months earlier, the report concluded that 
development on a worldwide solution to tackle GHG emissions from 
aviation continued to move forward.
220
 
On July 11, 2012, the ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environmental 
Protection (CAEP) announced that the organization attained a unanimous 
agreement on a system to measure carbon-dioxide emissions in aviation.
221
 
Under this newly approved approach, the CAEP attempted to develop a 
flexible system to appropriately convey benefits to those employing and 
advancing the latest technologies in their aircraft that positively correlated 
with the goal of reducing emissions while recognizing the full spectrum of 
technologies employed by different manufacturers.
222
 Following this initial 
step, the CAEP revealed on February 14, 2013 that another agreement for 
the procedures used to certify aircraft with respect to the emissions 
measurement standards had been developed.
223
  
Given these movements towards laying the foundation for a global 
MBM system and the growing possibility of a looming trade war, the 
ICAO Assembly moved forward with its own worldwide program at its 
Thirty-Eighth Session that ended in October 2013.
224
 In this landmark 
resolution, the ICAO agreed to bring forward in three years a specific plan 
 
 
 219. Id. at 3.  
 220. Id. at 6. Of note, the ICAO specifically clarified its point of view with regard to MBMs and 
the EU’s unilateral approach when it stated, “It is of utmost importance that the design and 
implementation of market-based measures for international aviation be treated as an element of 
ICAO’s comprehensive mitigation strategy to achieve the global aspirational goals, as part of global 
solutions for the sustainable development of international aviation, and not in isolation.” Id. 
 221. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG, ICAO Fact Sheet, Aircraft CO2 Emissions Standard Metric 
System, AN 1/17, 1 (2012), available at http://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Documents/CO2%20 
Metric%20System%20-%20Information%20Sheet_FINAL.PDF. This agreed upon approach takes 
measurements of the fuel burn performance of a given aircraft to supply a level of CO2 emissions 
 222. Id. The CAEP recognized that the system needed to provide meaningful emissions results 
over a diverse set of aircraft categories that maintained different purposes and capabilities. Id. It hoped 
that its plan would inspire and promote “the integration of fuel efficient technologies into aircraft 
design and development.” Id. 
 223. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ICAO Environmental Protection Committee Delivers Progress 
on New Aircraft CO2 and Noise Standards, COM 4/13 (2013), available at http://www.icao.int/ 
Newsroom/News%20Doc%202013/COM.4.13.EN.pdf  
 224. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and 
practices related to environmental protection—Climate change, Assemb. Res. A38-18 (2010), 
compiled in Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly, at 95, Provisional Ed. (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter 
ICAO Assemb. Resolution A38-18]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
34 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:1 
 
 
 
 
detailing a global MBM for curbing aircraft emissions by 2020.
225
 The 
resolution included language mirroring its predecessor, A37-19, which 
addressed sovereign rights and called for exemptions on aircraft under the 
jurisdiction of developing nations and the need to “engage in constructive 
bilateral and/or multilateral consultations and negotiations with other 
States to reach an agreement.”226 Much to the chagrin of the member 
nations from Europe, the ICAO’s actions temporarily superseded the EU’s 
ETS, being applicable to international aviation until the global MBM is 
approved.
227
 
In response to the new direction taken by the ICAO, the EC evaluated 
its alternatives and responses to Resolution A38-18.
228
 While the EC 
expressed its intention to submit formal reservations on those parts of the 
Resolution, which it disagreed with, the EC also recognized that there was 
significant progress and momentum towards a global MBM program.
229
 It 
also acknowledged that prior actions by the EU suspended the ETS 
program for aviation in order to promote progress towards a global 
solution through the ICAO.
230
 Based on these premises, the EC 
recommended amendments to the EU’s ETS as it applies to aviation.231 
Under its formal proposal to the EU, the EC recommended that the 
ETS remain in place for all flights between airports within its 
jurisdiction;
232
 however, the EC also recommended emissions exemptions 
in two other situations.
233
 First, the EC recommended a partial emissions 
exemption from 2014 to 2020 on the portion of those flights between the 
EU and countries outside its jurisdiction until the global MBM becomes 
 
 
 225. Id. The Resolution specifically calls for an all inclusive and broad based approach to 
incorporate “technologies, operational improvements and sustainable alternative fuels to achieve 
ICAO’s global aspirational goals.” Id.  
 226. Id. At the request of Russia along with Crazil, China, India, and South Africa, The ICAO 
approved this language on a vote of 97–39 for its inclusion in Resolution A38-13 over the opposition 
of the EU member nations and other major aviation nations. See EC Memo for Regional ETS, supra 
note 15, at 2.  
 227. Ewa Krukowska, Global Emissions Plan for Airlines Gets First UN Approval, BLOOMBERG, 
Oct. 4, 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-04/carbon-cuts-loom-for-airlines-
as-icao-eyes-global-market.html. 
 228. See EC Memo for Regional ETS, supra note 15.  
 229. Id. at 2–3. 
 230. Id. at 3.  
 231. Id.  
 232. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community, in view of the implementation by 2020 of an international agreement 
applying a single global market-based measure to international aviation emissions, COD 2013/0344 
final (Oct. 16, 2013), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM: 
2013:0722:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 233. Id. ¶ 2. 
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available and implemented.
234
 Second, the EC proposed a full exemption 
for flights traveling between the EU and countries outside its jurisdiction 
which qualify as developing nations and which contribute to less than one 
percent of the total global aviation emissions.
235
 
Thus, the EU’s game of brinksmanship continues to force the issue of 
creating a global MBM plan through the auspice of the ICAO, while 
simultaneously advancing its own agenda of bringing forth meaningful 
change to public policy on a regional and global level addressing aviation 
GHG emissions.  
II. EVALUATING THE ICAO’S GLOBAL TRADING SCHEME 
The cornerstone of the ICAO’s decision to develop and implement a 
global MBM program focuses on broad based applications of 
“technologies, operational improvements and sustainable alternative fuels 
to achieve ICAO’s global aspirational goals.”236 Many of these 
applications are in early developmental stages, yet the ICAO looks 
towards advances in these areas to achieve its ultimate goal of reducing 
GHGs from aviation by two percent each year until 2020. Accordingly, an 
evaluation of these initiatives and their ability to reduce aviation GHG 
emissions is apropos in determining whether the ICAO’s global MBM 
program can succeed.  
A. Technologies & Operational Initiatives 
In the U.S., an ongoing advancement in the aviation industry is the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)’s initiative to implement a 
satellite-based radar system utilizing GPS technology to accurately 
pinpoint an aircraft’s position in National Air Space (NAS) at all times.237 
In a steadfast effort to minimize commercial aircraft emissions and flight 
congestion in the U.S., the FAA developed The Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen is a U.S. Congressional 
initiative
238
 with the ultimate goal of modernizing NAS by guiding and 
 
 
 234. Id. ¶ 3. 
 235. Id. ¶ 10. 
 236. See ICAO Assemb. Resolution A38-18, supra note 203, at 95. 
 237. Genevra Williams, GPS For The Sky: A Survey of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) and Its Implementation in the United States, 74 J. AIR. L. & COM. 473, 482 (2009).  
 238. Justin T. Barkowski, Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories, and—Privatization?, 37 PEPP. L. 
REV. 247, 269 (2010). 
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tracking air traffic precisely and efficiently with the ultimate goal of 
minimizing air congestion while simultaneously saving fuel, diminishing 
aircraft noise, and reducing pollution.
239
 
NextGen was created to replace the U.S.’s current air traffic system, 
which utilizes an Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS)
240
 
with modern GPS.
241
 The ATCRBS is extraordinarily limited with its need 
for air traffic controllers to physically monitor radar screens and relay 
verbal instructions to pilots,
242
 suffering through eleven second blip delays 
alerting controllers to only periodic coordinates of flying aircraft,
243
 and is 
unavailable in various global areas where radar beacon system coverage 
does not exist.
244
 
The FAA anticipates that several long-term NextGen initiatives will be 
met by the year 2025,
245
 to include the reduction of airline delays (both in 
the air and during taxi) by thirty eight percent by 2020
246
 and the 
implementation of new technologies to include the Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), Data Communications (Data Comm) 
 
 
 239. Why NextGen Matters, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/why_nextgen_matters/ (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2012). 
 240. See FAA, Order JO 6360.12—Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) 
Performance Handbook (Nov. 23, 1977). 
 241. Ashley Halsey III, Modernization of Air Traffic Control May Be Delayed, WASH. POST, July 
4, 2011, available at, http://english.htu.cn/washington%20post/2011/07/04/Ax01.pdf. 
 242. Consider the Comair Flight 5191 flight which crashed during takeoff in Lexington, KY on 
August 27, 2006 killing all 47 passengers, crew and the pilot. The pilot of the Bombardier aircraft 
attempted a takeoff from the wrong runway. The National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) 
determined that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crewmembers’ failure to use 
available cues and aids to identify the airplane’s location on the airport surface during taxi and their 
failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. 
Contributing to the accident was the flight crew’s nonpertinent conversation during taxi, which 
resulted in a loss of positional awareness, and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) failure to 
require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control (ATC) clearances. 
Of the four safety issues discussed in the NTSB’s accident report, one recommended the 
implementation of cockpit moving map displays or cockpitrunway alerting systems. For more 
information regarding the Flight 5191 crash, see Attempted Takeoff From Wrong Runway Comair 
Flight 5191 Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N431CA Lexington, Kentucky August 27, 2006, Accident 
Report, NTSB/AAR-07/05 PB2007-910406, National Transportation Safety Board, http://www.ntsb. 
gov/doclib/reports/2007/AAR0705.pdf. 
 243. The FAA currently requires a minimum of 1,000 feet vertical separation between aircraft. See 
14 C.F.R. § 91 Appendix G, Section 1. 
 244. Halsey, supra note 241, at 7–8.  
 245. NextGen Implementation Plan, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/implementation/media/ 
NextGen_Implementation_Plan_2012.pdf (Mar. 2012) at 5. The 2025 deadline is called: Destination 
2025. For more information on this initiative, see Federal Aviation Administration, Destination 2025, 
FAA, http://www.faa.gov/about/plans_reports/media/Destination2025.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2012). 
 246. NextGen Implementation Plan, supra note 245, at 5. Note that in meeting this target, the FAA 
predicts the reduction of 14 million metric tons of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions and 1.4 billion 
gallons in cumulative reductions of jet fuel. 
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and Performance Based Navigation (PBN) in an attempt to increase safety, 
save time and fuel, and decrease aircraft exhaust emissions.
247
  
ADS-B, a satellite-based successor to ATCRBS, more precisely and 
efficiently tracks air traffic. It offers increased situational awareness by 
providing free in-cockpit traffic and weather information.
248
 ADS-B offers 
significant improvement to the archaic air traffic system for a number of 
reasons: it broadcasts immediate aircraft “location several times per 
second,”249 offers a quality signal which does not break down as does 
radar signal,
250
 and offers air traffic controllers identifiable information 
regarding specific aircraft.
251
 Further, ADS-B not only obtains an aircraft’s 
position utilizing GPS signals which broadcast information to air traffic 
control facilities and other aircraft, it also allows pilots to visualize the 
location of other air traffic within the system.
252
 As of 2011, over three 
hundred ADS-B ground stations were deemed operational, providing 
satellite-based surveillance coverage of numerous U.S. regions, including 
the East, West and Gulf coast areas as well as the majority of the U.S./ 
Canadian border.
253
 By 2014, it is expected that seven hundred radio 
stations will be in working order.
254
 
Data Comm, another component of NextGen, enables two-way 
information exchange between air traffic controllers and flight crew.
255
 It 
provides for pre-departure clearances allowing for last-minute flight plan 
amendments. It also offers improved ground situational awareness for 
pilots via flight-deck displays, which portray aircraft movement and 
positioning on a moving map.
256
 Moreover, improved tower displays allow 
controllers to better manage taxiways and runways via surface-movement 
 
 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. at 12. 
 249. See Williams, supra note 237, at 482 (citing generally Chris Kjelgaard, Fantastic Flight 
Decks to Fly You Safely, AVIATION (June 14, 2007), http://www.aviation.com/safety/070614 
flightdecktech2.html). 
 250. Id.  
 251. Id.  
 252. Justin Barkowski, Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories,—and Privatization?, 37 PEPP. L. 
REV. 247, 271 (2010) (citing Michael J. Harrison, ADS-X The Next Gen Approach for the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System 3C1-1 (2006)). 
 253. See NextGen Implementation Plan, supra note 245, at 5.  
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 36. 
 256. Id. at 23. 
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displays.
257
 The use of Data Comm during aircraft departure will result in 
fewer departure delays, reduced fuel consumption, and lower emissions.
258
 
PBN allows for more direct, fuel efficient routes while providing 
alternate routes around NAS disruptions, such as bad weather or 
unexpected congestion.
259
 Since being implemented, PBN procedures have 
allowed for the construction of specified flight paths without the limitation 
of requisite ground navigation aids. As of 2011, the FAA published forty-
nine Area Navigation (RNAV) routes, fifty-five RNAV arrival and 
departure procedures, and fifty-one Required Navigation Performance 
(RNP) Authorization Required approach procedures.
260
  
The implementation of NextGen is a major breakthrough in 
environmentally responsible advances in aviation in the U.S.; however, 
delays in instituting this program were announced in 2012, which could 
affect the FAA’s target implementation goals. Such delays are due to new 
and expanded runways at various national airports, a softer economy, 
airline schedule cuts, and budget pressures.
261
 Still, the FAA has a viable 
interest in developing long-term resolutions in commercial air travel to 
reduce emissions and flight congestion in the U.S. NextGen will not only 
provide certainty in the market, but flexibility in dealing with the 
increasing capacity of aircraft in our skies along with a reduction of 
emissions emanating from air traffic.
262
 
Outside the U.S., the use of GPS systems in aviation is limited to a 
small number of airports in Europe.
263
 Still, several global projects are 
under development to increase the utilization of such systems in aviation, 
including Zurich Airport, which is building a new GPS approach for one 
of its runways.
264
  
 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 24. 
 259. Id. at 7. 
 260. Id. at 12.  
 261. See Adrian Shofield, NextGen Breakeven Shifts to 2020, FAA Says, AVIATION WEEK (Mar. 
26, 2012), http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=comm&id=news/awx/ 
2012/03/22/awx_03_22_2012_p0-439330.xml&headline=NextGen%20Breakeven%20Shifts%20To% 
202020,%20FAA%20Says. 
 262. See J. David Grizzle, Amanda K. Bruchs, Robert A. Hawks & Lisa A. Holden, Navigating 
the Turbulence of Competing Interests: Principles and Practice of the Federal Aviation 
Administration, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 777, 804 (2010). 
 263. See Adam Twidell, The Use of GPS in Aviation, PRIVATEFLY (Feb. 29. 2012), http://blog. 
privatefly.com/gps-in-private-aviation. 
 264. Id.  
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B. Sustainable Alternative Fuels 
Another global approach to reduce aviation emissions comes in the 
form of sustainable alternative biofuels.
265
 The debate is open as to 
whether the use of biofuels is a responsible advancement in combating 
global climate change.
266
 A biofuel is a fuel made from biomass 
material.
267
 “Biomass refers to energy production through the use of 
biological material, either living or recently living.”268 Unlike other 
renewable energy sources, biomass can be converted directly into liquid 
fuels (or biofuels) to help meet transportation fuel needs.
269
 The two most 
common types of biofuels used today are ethanol
270
 and biodiesel.
271
 
As global economies struggle to wean themselves off fossil fuels, one 
of the most overwhelming challenges is finding an environmentally 
 
 
 265. See 2014 Environment Report, BOEING, available at http://www.boeing.com/aboutus/ 
environment/environment_report_14/4.2_engaging_the_industry.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2014). 
 266. See, e.g., Justice Rick Strange, Weaving A Tangled Web: The Intersection of Energy Policy 
and Broader Governmental Policies, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 23 (2009) (Noting the 
warnings that ethanol production is generating global food insecurity at unprecedented scales); 
Timothy A. Slating and Kay P. Kesan, The Renewable Fuel Standard 3.0?: Moving Forward With the 
Federal Biofuel Mandate, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 374, 398 (2014) (documenting that the U.S. First 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS1) was supported due to the fact that biofuels can potentially have a 
significant role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector); David B. Hunter, 
The Confluence of Human Rights and the Environment: Human Rights Implications for Climate 
Change Negotiations, 11 OR. REV. INT’L 331, 355 (2009) (presenting that increasing biofuel 
production to a level that can significantly impact total greenhouse gas concentrations will have 
significant implications for the availability and price of food); Howard A. Latin, A New Direction in 
Climate Change Policy?: Keynote Speaker: Climate Change Mitigation and Decarbonization, 25 
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 67–68 (2014) (discussing the environmental dangers associated with biofuels, to 
include their negative impact on food supplies, prices and security, as well as concerns that the 
production of biofuels actually releases green house gases into the air, thereby potentially counter-
balancing the positive effect of their use on the environment). 
 267. Brett Buchheit, The Economics of Alternative Energy: Decisions Following the IPCC’s 
Report on Climate Change, 38 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 73, 82 (2008) (citing Biomass FAQs, U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, BIOMASS PROGRAM, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/biomass/biomass_basics_faqs.html (last 
visited June 13, 2012)). 
 268. Id. at 80. 
 269. Biofuels Basics, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, http://www.nrel.gov/ 
learning/re_biofuels.html (last visited June 13, 2012). 
 270. Ethanol is an alcohol biofuel made from starches and sugars (the same used in beer and wine) 
made either by fermenting a biomass high in carbohydrates, or through a process known as 
gasification which uses high temperatures and a low-oxygen environment to convert biomass into 
synthesis gas, a mixture of hydrogen and carbon monoxide. Ethanol is generally used as a blending 
agent with gasoline to increase octane and cut down on carbon monoxide and smog-causing emissions. 
See id. 
 271. Biodiesel is made by combining alcohol with vegetable oil, animal fat, or recycled cooking 
grease. See id.  
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trustworthy replacement for the liquid fuels that power aircraft.
272
 The 
global aviation industry uses an enormous amount of jet fuel.
273
 The U.S. 
commercial airline industry burns about forty eight million gallons of jet 
fuel every day, which accounts for thirty five percent of the industry’s 
total operating costs.
274
 As such, biofuels are the leading contenders in the 
effort to find a more renewable energy source within the aviation 
industry.
275
  
On February 24, 2008, Virgin Atlantic Airways (Virgin Atlantic) 
joined forces with Boeing and General Electric Aviation (GE) to become 
the first airline to fly a commercial aircraft using a biofuel mixture.
276
 The 
one hour and twenty minute flight of Virgin Atlantic’s Boeing 747-400 
utilized a blend of twenty percent biofuel (a mixture of coconut and 
babassu oil) and eighty percent conventional jet fuel.
277
  
While Virgin Atlantic may have been the first, it is not the only 
commercial airliner to test and utilize biofuel blends in the aviation 
industry. On November 23, 2008 KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) 
operated a Boeing 747 carrying the first passenger-load using a biofuel 
mix.
278
 Almost three years later, KLM launched another commercial flight 
from Amsterdam to Paris using biokerosene made from recycled cooking 
oil.
279
 In October 2011 British-based Thomson Airways flew a commercial 
flight fueled by a mixture of waste fat and A-1 jet fuel.
280
 The flight of the 
Boeing 757-200 was the first of its kind in the UK to fly passengers using 
a biofuel mix.  
 
 
 272. David Biello, For Greening Aviation, Are Biofuels the Right Stuff?, YALE ENVIRONMENT 
360 (June 11, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/for_greening_aviation__are_biofuels_the_right_ 
stuff/2160/. 
 273. Aviation jet fuel, or kerosene, is frequently referred to as Jet A or JP-8. See Kerosene/Jet 
Fuel Category Assessment Document, THE AM. PETROLEUM INST. PETROLEUM HPV TESTING GRP. at 
6 (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/hpv/pubs/summaries/kerjetfc/c15020ad2.pdf 
 274. Mary Beth Quirk, FAA: There Are Less Flights To Be Had & They’re Getting More 
Expensive, THE CONSUMERIST (Mar. 9, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://consumerist.com/2012/03/faa-there-
are-less-flights-to-be-had-theyre-getting-more-expensive.html. 
 275. See Biello, supra note 272.  
 276. See BBC NEWS, Airline In First Biofuel Flight (Feb. 24, 2008, 15:32, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7261214.stm. 
 277. News Release, Boeing, Virgin Atlantic and GE Aviation To Fly First Commercial Jet on 
Biofuel (Feb. 24, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2008-02-24-
Boeing-Virgin-Atlantic-and-GE-Aviation-to-Fly-First-Commercial-Jet-on-Biofuel?printable. 
 278. Sustainable Biofuels, ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES (“KLM”), http://www.klm.com/csr/en/ 
climate/footprint/biofuels/index.html (last visited June 14, 2012). The flight operated using one of the 
four Boeing 747 engines using a mixture of 50% biofuel made from camelina. 
 279. Id.  
 280. See Britain’s First Biofuel Passenger Flight Touches Down Amid Worries from 
Environmentalists, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 7, 2011, 11:02 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/ 
article-2046460/Thomson-Airways-biofuel-flight-touches-down.html. 
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German-carrier Lufthansa launched the first regular biofuel-powered 
commercial flight on July 15, 2011. The six-month trial
281
 using an Airbus 
A321, flew the Hamburg-Frankfurt-Hamburg path four times a day over 
the trial phase.
282
 For the duration of the testing period, one of the A321’s 
twin-engines ran on a fifty-fifty mixture “of regular jet fuel and 
biosynthetic kerosene”283 consisting of jatropha,284 camelina,285 and animal 
fats.
286
 In April 2012, Australian-based Qantas flew an A330 powered by a 
fifty-fifty blend of conventional jet fuel and biofuel derived from cooking 
oil.
287
 
United Airlines was the first U.S. commercial carrier to operate an 
aircraft using a biofuel blend in November 2011.
288
 Following the Boeing 
737-800 flight from Houston to Chicago, United-Continental announced it 
signed a letter of intent with Solazyme
289
 to negotiate the purchase of 
twenty million gallons of jet fuel per year, derived exclusively from algae 
oil for delivery as early as 2014.
290
 That same month, Alaska Airlines and 
its sister-carrier Horizon Air operated the first of seventy-five passenger 
flights using a twenty percent biofuel blend made from cooking oil.
291
  
 
 
 281. The Lufthansa biofuel trial ended on January 12, 2012 due to its running out of the biofuel 
mix with no other viable supplies available. However, during the trial period Lufthansa operated 1,187 
biofuel flights with initial calculations showing carbon dioxide emissions were reduced by 1,471 tons. 
See Lufthansa Ends Biofuel Trial with U.S. Flight, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2012, 12:13PM EST), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/09/uk-lufthansa-biofuels-idUSLNE80802I20120109. 
 282. Press Release, Lufthansa, Lufthansa Launches First Scheduled Flights Using Biofuel (July 
15, 2011) (on file with author), available at http://www.lufthansagroup.com/index.php?id= 
322&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1980&L=1&print=1&no_cache=1. 
 283. Id. The biofuel mixture was produced by Nestle Oil. 
 284. Id. See also Kamrun Nahar and Monica Ozores-Hampton, Jatropha: An Alternative 
Substitute to Fossil Fuel, IFAS Extension University of Florida, Publication # HS1193, at 5, available 
at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/hs1193 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014) (discussing that Jatropha is a plant which 
produces seeds that, when crushed, can be used in the production of biodiesel). 
 285. See Lufthansa launches first scheduled flights using biofuel, supra note 268. See also 
Camelina Information, Sustainable Oils, available at http://www.susoils.com/camelina/ (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2014) (providing that Camelina, which is derived from the mustard family, contains oils used 
in biofuel production). 
 286. Press Release, Lufthansa supra note 267.  
 287. Qantas Spruiks Biofuels With A330 Flight, AUSTRALIAN AVIATION (Apr. 13, 2012, 2:20 PM) 
http://australianaviation.com.au/2012/04/qantas-spruiks-biofuels-with-a330-flight/. 
 288. The fuel-mix, produced by Solazyme, is a 40/60 blend of sustainable biofuel derived from 
algae and traditional petroleum-derived jet fuel. See Press Release, United Airlines Flies First U.S. 
Commercial Advanced Biofuel Flight (Nov. 7, 2011) (on file with author), available at 
http://ir.unitedcontinentalholdings.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=83680&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1627061 
 289. Solazyme Inc., headquartered in San Francisco, California, is an alternative energy company 
specializing in the production of algae fuel. See SOLAZYME, http://solazyme.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 
2012). 
 290. Id.  
 291. Race for Scale: United, Alaska Airlines Launch Commercial Aviation Biofuels Flights, 
BIOFUELS DIGEST (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2011/11/07/race-for-scale-
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Due to the global effort to reduce GHG emissions, there is little 
surprise that the aviation industry is testing biofuel blends for commercial 
flights. The increasing price of jet fuel is a rising challenge in an industry 
desperate to maintain profits. While the cost of jet fuel in the second 
quarter of 2012 went down,
292
 it was the airline industry’s largest expense 
in 2011 representing thirty-five percent of total costs and reaching a record 
high of $3.00 per gallon that year.
293
 In March of 2012, the price of jet fuel 
reached $3.20 per gallon before siphoning off. Due to the high cost of fuel 
in 2011, U.S. airlines spent about $50.5 billion on fuel, up from $38.8 
billion in 2010, and were forced to raise ticket prices nine times in 2011 in 
order to make a profit.
294
 The FAA anticipates the cost of oil to reach $138 
per barrel by 2032.
295
 
Further, the use of biofuels in lieu of jet fuel is another testament to the 
global aviation industry’s interest in reducing its carbon footprint. Energy 
for transportation consumes sixty-three percent of all oil used in the U.S, 
and foreign oil accounts for more than half of all oil used in the U.S.
296
 
The fact that oil is nonrenewable and that the U.S. is highly dependent on 
foreign sources for energy are tremendous incentives for developing 
renewable energy sources.
297
 As a major consumer of non-renewable 
energy resources, including fossil fuels, transportation is deemed the 
largest end-use source of carbon dioxide.
298 
 
 
 
united-alaska-airlines-launch-commercial-aviation-biofuels-flights/. 
 292. Trefis Team, Delta Is Right In Hedging Jet-Fuel Prices, Trefis (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://www.trefis.com/stock/dal/articles/139697/delta-is-right-in-hedging-jet-fuel-price/2012-08-21 
(noting that during the second quarter of 2012, the price of jet-fuel declined) 
 293. Candice Leigh Helfand, High Gas Prices Raising Airline Ticket Costs, CBS DC (Mar. 1, 
2012, 11:33 AM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/03/01/high-gas-prices-raising-airline-ticket-
costs-curbing-holiday-travel/. 
 294. Bart Jansen, Fares Expected to Soar Through Summer; Blame Jet Fuel Costs, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 14, 2012, 1:16 PM), http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/story/2012-03-13/Fares-expected-to-soar-
through-summer-blame-jet-fuel-costs/53515892/1. 
 295. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST, FISCAL YEARS 2012—2032, HQ-
121545 at 35, available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation 
_forecasts/aerospace_forecasts/2012-2032/media/2012%20FAA%20Aerospace%20Forecast.pdf. The 
FAA’s prediction is derived from IHS Global Insight, as measured by the Refiner’s Acquisition Cost. 
Specifically, the price of oil is predicted to reach $100 per barrel in 2012, $115 per barrel by 2015, 
increase to $118 per barrel by 2025 and hit a high of $138 by 2032, all the while increasing at a faster 
rate than inflation. Id. 
 296. Dinesh Mohan, Charles U. Pittman, Jr., Philip H. Steele, Pyrolysis of Wood/Biomass for Bio-
oil: A Critical Review, ENERGY AND FUELS, 20, 848 (2006). 
 297. Id.  
 298. See Transportation and Climate, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
(“EPA”) (last updated Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/basicinfo.htm (indicates that 
CO2 is the most prevalent greenhouse gas.). 
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The road to successfully incorporating biofuels into the global 
commercial aviation sector is long, since the use of biofuels as a 
renewable energy resource has been met with some skepticism. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the high cost of jet fuel is a rising concern 
within the industry, the cost of biofuels is also troublesome. In New York, 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (“BNEF”) projects jatropha-based jet 
fuel (currently the most affordable category of aviation biofuels) to cost 
about $3.25 per gallon by 2018, followed by fuel made from woody 
biomass (the next most affordable category)
299
 at $3.40 per gallon by 
2018.
300
 Critics of the United Airlines commercial biofuel flight in 
November 2011 noted that the airline paid six times the cost of regular 
fuel for the biofuel used in the demonstration.
301
 Further, Alaska Airlines 
paid $16.00 per gallon for the biofuel used during its flights as compared 
to the $3.15 it would have cost to use Jet-A fuel.
302
 
Consider further Virgin Atlantic’s inaugural biofuel flight. Critics 
alleged that Virgin Atlantic was not testing biofuels for the purpose of 
ultimately reducing GHGs, but to promote the flight for marketing 
purposes.
303
 Perhaps a valid argument, considering that Imperium 
Renewables, the biofuel developers for the flight, maintain that the blend 
used during the test flight is not a realistic substitute for the eighty seven 
billion gallons of fuel needed each year to fly the world’s airline fleets.304 
Advocacy groups further attack biofuel use for their negative impacts on 
the environment, including water shortages due to the huge volume of 
 
 
 299. The pyrolysis of woody biomass refers to a process converting biomass to liquid fuels. 
Pyrolysis converts organics to solid, liquid, and gas by heating in the absence of oxygen. Further, the 
wood preservative industry utilizes this means to find a low-cost and environmentally friendly means 
to dispose of treated wood products. See Mohan et al., supra note 282, at 849. See also zhoyle, 
Biomass Energy from Southern Forests, CompassLive (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.srs.fs.usda. 
gov/compass/2013/12/31/biomass-energy-from-southern-forests/ (noting that Biochemical and 
thermochemical technologies used to produce liquid fuel from woody biomass are not yet 
commercially viable). 
 300. The Future of Aviation Biofuels, BIOFUELS DIGEST (Feb. 20, 2012) http://oilprice.com/ 
Alternative-Energy/Biofuels/The-Future-of-Aviation-Biofuels.html. 
 301. Melody M. Bombgardner, Flying the Green Skies with Biofuel, CHEMICAL AND 
ENGINEERING NEWS, VOL. 90, ISSUE 24, pp. 18–24 (June 11, 2012), http://cen.acs.org/articles/90/ 
i24/Flying-Green-Skies-Biofuels.html. 
 302. Jason Paur, High Cost Makes Aviation Biofuel Slow To Take Off, AUTOPIA (Nov. 10, 2011 
6:55PM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2011/11/aviation-biofuel/. 
 303. Avi Brisman, It Takes Green to Be Green: Environmental Elitism, “Ritual Displays,” and 
Conspicuous Non-Consumption, 85 N. D. L. REV. 329, 339 (2009). 
 304. Jennifer Conlin, Trying to Lighten That Carbon Footprint, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2008), 
http://travel.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/travel/04green.html. In her article, Conlin notes that Friends of 
the Earth, an international environmental network, criticized Virgin Atlantic’s flight promotion as a 
trendy public relations stunt, reiterating that carbon savings from biofuels are negligible and that 
growing crops for alternative fuels cuts into land used to grow food as well as drives deforestation. Id.  
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biofuels needed to process grains or sugar into ethanol, expanded acreage 
requiring extensive fertilization, the addition of nitrogen and phosphorus 
to local watersheds which starve water bodies of the oxygen needed to 
support aquatic life, and the vast crop acreage needed to feed biofuel 
feedstock.
305
  
Although the EU unilaterally increased the global pressure to lower 
aviation emissions expulsion, biofuel blends are not currently the most 
cost-effective approach to meeting the ETS standards. Factually, biofuel 
costs are almost double that which airlines pay for kerosene;
306
 however, 
in March 2012, Boeing, Airbus and Embraer signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) in an effort to promote the development of 
affordable aviation biofuels.
307
 These three leading aircraft manufacturers 
agreed to collaborate in speaking to governments, biofuel producers and 
key stakeholders “to support, promote and accelerate the availability of 
sustainable jet fuel sources
308
 Also, in March 2012, the White House 
promised up to thirty-five million dollars over three years to support 
research and development in advancing biofuels, bioenergy, and biobased 
products.
309
 The projects, to be funded through the Biomass Research and 
Development Initiative (BRDI)—a joint program through the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. Energy Department 
(USED)—aim to help “develop economically and environmentally 
sustainable sources of renewable biomass and increase the availability of 
renewable fuels” to help replace the need for gasoline and diesel.310  
One promising development is the use of the previously noted jatropha 
plant.
311
 Jatropha is an opportunistic choice for biofuel use as it can be 
 
 
 305. C. Ford Runge, The Case Against Biofuels: Probing Ethanol’s Hidden Costs, YALE ENV’T 
360 (Mar. 11, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_case_against_biofuels_probing_ethanols_ 
hidden_costs/2251/. A 2007 study in Science noted that to replace just 10% of the gasoline in the U.S. 
with ethanol and biodiesel would require 43% of current U.S. cropland for biofuel feedstocks. The EU 
would need to commit 38% of its cropland base. Otherwise, new lands will need to be brought into 
cultivation, drawn disproportionately from those more vulnerable to environmental damage, such as 
forests. 
 306. Robert Wall, Concerns About Biofuels, ETS Gain Strength, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_10_24_2011_p28-
384460.xml. 
 307. Press Release, Airbus, Boeing, Embraer Collaborate on Aviation Biofuel Commercialisation 
(Mar. 22, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://www.airbus.com/presscentre/pressreleases/ 
press-release-detail/detail/airbus-boeing-embraer-collaborate-on-aviation-biofuel-commercialisation/. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Obama Administration To Fund Next Generation Biofuels Research, US DEP’T OF ENERGY 
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/daily.cfm/hp_news_id=345. 
 310. Id.  
 311. Jatropha is a drought-resistant plant, which grows well in marginal or poor soil, producing 
seeds with an oil content which can be combusted as fuel without being refined. For more information 
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grown virtually anywhere in the world without requiring substantial water 
or fertilizer, and is estimated to cost half of the price of fuels produced 
from corn.
312
 Recently, BNEF concluded that if production efficiency 
continues to improve, the cost of certain biofuels, including jatropha, 
could be competitive with the cost of fossil-based jet fuel by 2018.
313
 Such 
competitive pricing is necessary to keep the commercial aviation industry 
running, as it is entirely dependent on petroleum-based jet fuel, regardless 
of the source, price, or ultimate environmental concerns.
314
 And as the 
IATA has called for six percent of jet fuel demand to be met by biofuels 
by 2020, finding a realistic option, which will keep fuel prices reasonably 
competitive and environmentally friendly is key to finding a trustworthy 
biofuel solution.  
As the quest to implement biofuels into the aviation sector continues, 
advocates aggressively work to find viable options to reduce the use of 
pure kerosene jet fuel in commercial aviation. While critics allude to 
certain negative impacts that biofuels have on the environment, research 
indicates that the development of alternative sustainable biofuels that are 
both cost-effective and environmentally friendly is on the horizon. In the 
wake of the EU’s implementation of the ETS, and to further meet the 
ICAO’s MGM future goals, developing a more environmentally 
sustainable and cost-effective aviation fuel in the form of biofuel blends 
may be the wave of the future. 
C. Overall Analysis 
As the ICAO’s MBM program continues to develop, the organization 
will further articulate a policy direction and determine which plans qualify 
based on a globally agreed upon criteria.
315
 To this extent, the annual GHG 
reduction goals by 2020 along with the aspirational objectives for the 
ensuing years thereafter will serve as the overarching benchmark, while 
 
 
on the jatropha plant, See About Jatropha Plant, JATROPHA WORLD, http://www.jatrophabiodiesel.org/ 
aboutJatrophaPlant.php (last visited July 17, 2012). 
 312. Zachary M. Wallen, Note, Far From a Can of Corn: A Case for Reforming Ethanol Policy, 
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 151 (2010). 
 313. Jatropha Oil-Based Aviation Biofuels Cost-Competitive By 2018, Finds Bloomberg Study, 
JATRO BIOJET FUEL (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.jatrofuels.com/835-0-Jatropha+oil-based+aviation+ 
biofuels+cost-competitive+by+2018+finds+Bloomberg+study.html. Note, the Bloomberg Study 
projects that Jatropha can produce jet fuel at $0.86 a litre ($3.25 per gallon) by 2018, making it a front-
runner in the world of biofuel production for both cost and environmental friendliness. 
 314. See Agriculture and Aviation: Partners in Prosperity, USDA (Jan. 2012) at 9, available at 
http://www.usda.gov/documents/usda-farm-to-fly-report-jan-2012.pdf. 
 315. See ICAO Assemb. Resolution A38-18, supra note 224. 
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the subsequent agreement on a system for measurement will provide the 
initial means for assessment.
316
  
In time, the ICAO will need to make the important decision as to 
whether to allow a qualifying plan from a participating country to satisfy 
the stated goals solely through the reductions in GHGs produced, based on 
improvements in efficiency, or a combination of the two. In essence, the 
ICAO’s role in reducing GHG now becomes that of an arbitrator as well 
because its MBM program will set the global policies while allowing 
flexibility amongst its members to determine its own jurisdictional 
approach within those constructs.  
With the ICAO following such a course, the EU may find it necessary 
to modify its current noncommittal position that seeks GHG output 
reductions in lieu of improvements to efficiency.
317
 The language of the 
EU’s ETS allows for an exemption on the basis of “equivalent measures,” 
which provides a convenient opportunity for it to point to its continued 
leadership on the GHG issues while retaining a stance that it did not cave 
to international pressures.
318
 
Accordingly, the ICAO’s MBM solution appears to offer a middle 
ground for the many nations involved in addressing and implementing an 
approach to reducing GHG emissions that emanate from aviation sources 
while providing suitable opportunities to incorporate technological 
advances into the solution. Thus, the ICAO’s MBM addresses the main 
concerns that motivated the EU’s ETS while including many of the 
approaches considered important by other nations, offering a solution that 
addresses aviation GHGs in order to bring forth meaningful reductions 
over time. 
CONCLUSION 
The EU continues to expand upon its reputation for brining 
international stakeholders to the negotiating table on subjects they would 
not ordinarily agree to discuss.
319
 
The ICAO appeared trapped in endless studies to determine a course of 
action with regard to addressing GHG emissions from aviation when the 
EU’s patience waned, so it decided to leverage its unique position in the 
 
 
 316. Id. 
 317. See generally Hart, supra note 191 (citing translation from Ou meng yuan tan tao huo mian 
(European Union Wants to Talk About Exemption)), 21 SHI JI JING JI BAO DAO (21 Century Economic 
Report) (July 19, 2011), available at http://stock.jrj.com.cn/2011/07/19034010476743.shtml. 
 318. Id.  
 319. See Katelyn E. Ciolino, supra note 12, at 1186. 
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market to pressure other nations into tackling this difficult issue and to 
become a major policy topic. 
The pressure from numerous member countries that opposed the EU’s 
plan to include foreign flagged carriers, along with losses in the courts and 
unpalatable options for a challenge through other conventions and treaties, 
provided enough momentum within the ICAO to develop a global and 
comprehensive solution to GHG emissions in aviation. While the ICAO’s 
MBM program continues to emerge from its nascent stages, it offers 
enough substance to delay implementation of the EU’s ETS for foreign 
flagged carriers and deliver a comprehensive global solution rather than a 
unilateral one imposed by a block of nations upon the world.  
The EU’s game of brinksmanship forced conflicting parties to address 
GHG emissions within the realm of aviation. As no other countries or 
member nations had previously placed a high value on achieving a global 
objective to reduce GHG emissions emanating from aircraft, the EU’s 
unilateral movement ultimately compelled the ICAO to undertake its role 
of assessing the appropriate global methods for reducing GHG emissions 
within the aviation sector. Such undertaking was a necessary response to 
help reduce a rising global conflict, which seemed to be moving towards 
unacceptable levels among EU member nations. 
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